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INTRODUCTION

America's freedom of locomotion is in danger. We have long
enjoyed the liberty to walk the streets and move about the country
free from arbitrary government intrusion. Freedom to travel,
whether locally or between states, without having to either account
for our presence or carry official papers, is one of the "cherished
liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others."' Like
many other freedoms, the right of locomotion is misunderstood and
taken for granted. The Supreme Court has placed this right at risk
by undermining its central constitutional underpinnings through restrictive interpretation of the fourth amendment.
It is ironic that the decline of the right of locomotion has corresponded with the ascent of another cherished value-the right to
privacy, which is protected by the fourth amendment and other constitutional provisions. Perhaps because the right of locomotion is
taken for granted, courts rarely give it due consideration in fourth
amendment adjudication. Yet the fourth amendment was meant to,
does, and should protect us in our public as well as in our private
I Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord State ix reL
Ekstrom v.Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring) ("The thought that an American can be compelled to 'show his papers' before
exercising his right to walk the streets, drive the highways or board the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals."); Florida v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182, 198-99
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (en banc) (Anstead, J., dissenting) ("It is in cases like this
that we must confront the question of whether our system of government is really that
different from systems prevailing in other countries where the routine boarding of public transportation and confrontation of passengers by police officers is accepted without
question.").
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lives. The growing emphasis on privacy values in the Constitution
may obscure the public travel values it should also protect.
Put simply, today's Supreme Court slights the right of locomotion. The substantial discretion given to police officers in their confrontations with citizens has severely restricted that right. Part I of
this Article briefly discusses the right of locomotion. Parts II and III
trace the history of the Court's attack on the right of locomotion and
then critique the Court's reasoning. Adopting the perspective of
the citizen on the street, this Article examines the Court's proffered
justifications for limiting the right of locomotion, and explores
whether these justifications are consistent with the Court's own
2
promise to protect the citizenry from "arbitrary and oppressive"
police behavior.
Part IV highlights the Court's overemphasis of privacy concerns
at the expense of the right of locomotion. It also questions the
continued viability of the Teny 3 balancing rule and advocates that
street encounters no longer be judged by the reasonable suspicion
test. Part IV then argues that this extremely deferential standard of
review for police actions is unjustified. The Article concludes by
asking whether the "war on drugs" has exacted too heavy a cost in
terms of constitutional freedom.
I
THE RIGHT OF LOCOMOTION

The idea of a right of locomotion is neither novel nor radical.
Americans have enjoyed the freedom to walk the streets and move
about the country free from unreasonable government intrusion for
many years. 4 Indeed, an apt-description of the right of locomotion
was set forth almost sixty years ago by the Ninth Circuit when it
stated that:
Personal liberty, which is guarantied [sic] to every citizen under
our constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion-to
go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to
one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of
2 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
4 Of course, not all Americans have been able to move freely about the country. In
many parts of colonial America, both North and South, Negroes were required to carry
"passes." See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MAITER OF COLOR, RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD

171 (1978).

Both before and after the Civil War, blacks-free and slaved-were restricted in

their freedom of movement in parts of the North and South. Prior to the war, both
antislavery and white supremacist feelings led Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and Oregon to bar
blacks from entering the state. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 at 26 (1988).
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others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. 5

The right of locomotion is grounded in two fundamental commit-

ments contained in the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. First, the fourth amendment includes "the
right to be let alone" from government interference. 6 In the context of police-citizen encounters on the street, this right can be enjoyed only if the discretion of police officers is adequately checked,

thus preventing officers from having "dictatorial power over the
7

streets."
*The second constitutional column that supports a right of locomotion is the fourth amendment's protection of personal security.8
This commitment to personal security and the shared general vision
that all citizens are free to travel 9 seemingly combine to afford the
citizen on the street substantive, as well as procedural, protection
against unreasonable police interference. 10 Individuals could
5 Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1931) (quoting Pinkerton v.
Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579, "582(1889)). In Anduha, the court invalidated
a vagrancy law because it was unconstitutionally vague., Although Anduha spoke of the
personal rights of all citizens in general, and a broad constitutionally protected right of
locomotion in particular, the court "did not indicate from which amendment [of the
Constitution] these rights were derived." Note, Locomotion, Liberty and Legislation, 32
MONT.L. REV. 279, 282 (1971) (authored by P. Bruce Harper). For a discussion of federal protection of the freedom of movement, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, FederalConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes
of DispleasingPolice Officers, and the Like, 3 CraM. L. BuLL. 205 (1967).
6 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
7 Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 222.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The first clause of the fourth amendment states: "It]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." Id.
9 In this sense, the fourth amendment's protection of the personal liberty and security of those who move about the streets is collateral to the right to travel recognized
by other provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
629 (1969). The Shapiro court noted:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations ivhich unreasonably burden
or restrict this movement.
Id
The constitutional source of the right to travel has been a frequently debated topic.
See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 78-81
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
10 The first clause of the fourth amendment recognizes an independent right of
personal sovereignty and liberty. See supra note 8; see also NELSON B. LAssON, THE HisTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrU-

103 (1937) (the initial clause of the fourth amendment grants an independent right
of security from unreasonable search and seizure; the prohibition contained therein was
designed to "cover something other than the form of [a] warrant."); Clark Cunningham,
A LinguisticAnalysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the FourthAmendment: A Searchfor Common
Sense, 73 IowA L. REV. 541, 552 (1988) (The drafters of the fourth amendment created
"two constitutional mandates." "Not only would the fourth amendment ban certain
TION
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therefore anticipate the same degree of constitutional protection for
their freedom of movement as they enjoy within their homes."'
Until recently, the Court did not hesitate to draw on these
fourth amendment promises in recognizing a right of locomotion.
In 1925, the Court declared that "those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent
official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise."' 1 2 The
Court made clear in a later series of cases that a mere suspicion of
criminal activity was insufficient to justify seizing a person on the
street.1 3 These cases reflected the view that "[u]nder our system
14
suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen."
Even in contexts in which it was unnecessary to invoke the fourth
amendment, the Court struck down laws that made the right to
stand or walk on a public sidewalk dependent on "the whim of any
types of warrants, but it also would generally prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures
that violated the right of the people to be secure."). But see Waters v. Barry, 711 F.
Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that the fourth amendment only affords procedural
protection). I have argued elsewhere that the reasoning of Waters is misplaced. Tracey
Maclin, Seeing the Constitution From the Backseat of a Police Squad Car: An Essay on Tempered
Zeal by H. Richard Uviller (Book Review), 70 B.U.L. REV. 543 (1990). For a general discussion on the relationship between the fourth amendment's two clauses, see Silas Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989).
11 But cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (where there is probable
cause for arrest, the warrantless arrest of a felony suspect found in public does not violate the fourth amendment even in circumstances where the police could have obtained
a warrant prior to the arrest).
When the privacy of a citizen's home is at stake, the Court has been more generous
in its reading of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984) (fourth amendment bars warrantless night entry of the home in order to arrest
for nonjailable traffic offense); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (fourth
amendment prohibits search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third
party without valid search warrant); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980)
(where there are no exigent circumstances, an officer must have a warrant before crossing the threshold of a house); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (President may not authorize electronic surveillance in domestic security matters
without prior judicial authorization). But cf. New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990)
(exclusionary rule does not bar use of an incriminating statement taken from the defendant outside his home despite his being arrested in violation of Payton, if there is probable
cause for arrest); Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (pursuant to an arrest warrant, officers may conduct warrantless "protective sweep" of entire house if they have
reasonable suspicion that dangerous individuals are on premises).
12
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); accord Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (The citizen traveling on the highway "who has given no
good cause for believing he is engaged in [illegal] activity is entitled to proceed on his
way without interference." Id. at 177.).
13 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-04 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 593-95 (1948).
14 Henry, 361 U.S. at 104.

1990]

THE RIGHT OF LOCOMOTION

1263

5

police officer."'
More recently, the Court refused to sanction seizures based
solely on a person's suspicious appearance or on the need to assert
a "police presence" into an ambiguous situation. In Brown v.
Texas, 16 the Court held that where there is no reason to suspect misconduct, "the balance between the public interest and [one's] right
to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police
interference."'17 Moreover, the fourth amendment analysis does not
change because of advances in technology. In Delaware v. Prouse,' 8
the Court held that citizens were not shorn of their fourth amendment right of liberty merely because they "stepp[ed] from the sidewalks into their automobiles."'19 The Court also denied police
officials the right to conduct random or arbitrary seizures for the
purpose of checking a motorist's identification. 20 To allow this ac15 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). Laws that authorize arrest based on vague standards trigger the concern that the police will exercise their
authority in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Where this occurs in the context of
street encounters, it "implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of
movement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (citations omitted); see
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169-71 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971).
The right to stand or loiter, although not traditionally considered a part of fourth
amendment freedoms, might be considered a corollary right to the freedom of locomotion. See Note, Orders to Move On and the Prmrentionof Crime, 87 YALE Lj.603, 622 (1978)
(A person given an order to move on by a police officer is "deprived of his freedom to
go where he wishes, and he may have to abandon some legitimate activity he has
planned. Although this restraint is less severe than arrest, it is a 'seizure' of the person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). Cf.Comment, Is There Something Suspidous About the Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 717, 729-30 (1989) (authored by Jordan Berns) (loitering and prowling laws have been criticized because they
"permit arrest on suspicion of criminal activity rather than on probable cause as mandated under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.").
16 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
17 Id. at 52.
18 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
19 Id. at 663.
20 Prouse held that unless there is a specific reason to believe that a motorist has
violated the law, "stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. The suggestion in Prouse, as well as Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, that a
seizure is permissible-even where individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is absentwas formally endorsed in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).
Sitz upheld the use of temporary highway sobriety checkpoints. The roadblock at issue
in Sitz involved stopping all vehicles passing through the checkpoint in order to examine
drivers for signs of intoxication. Id. at 2484. According to ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the
state's interest in preventing drunk driving, the extent that sobriety checkpoints advance
that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists, "weighs in favor" of
upholding sobriety checkpoints. Id at 2488.
Because Sitz was decided after this Article was completed, a detailed critique is not
possible here. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the Court's result
allows seizures that grant police substantial leeway to interfere with the right of locomotion. See Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2493, 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A Michigan officer who
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tion would create a "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion." 2'
Taken together, Brown and Prouse reflect a feeling that on the streets
of this country, in contrast to other nations, the individual is sovereign. The Constitution mandates that the citizenry is beyond the
reach of state intrusion unless the government has good reason to
22
believe that a crime has been or is being committed.
II
THE DOCTRINAL WEAPONS USED TO LIMIT THE RIGHT OF
LOCOMOTION

In assessing street-level encounters between police officers and
citizens, the Court purports to balance the constitutional interests of
the individual against the societal need for effective law enforcement. But the Court's claim that it is engaged in balancing is deceptive. Rather than using a balancing test, the Court uses a set of
three tacit rules that provide the doctrinal foundation for its decisions involving police-citizen encounters.
The first is the "right-to-inquire" rule. Under it, police officials
may accost, 23 stop, and question any citizen found in a public place.
The second is the "common sense" rule, under which the Court
shuns what it calls "rigid" or "technical" directives in limiting the
authority of officers conducting intrusive investigations. The third
rule involves "waiver of privacy." Under this rule, the Court deems
that pedestrians have "waived" their constitutional protections
against certain types of police intrusions that would not be tolerated
if they occurred in a person's home. 2 4 Citizens therefore have no
questions a motorist [seized] at a sobriety checkpoint has virtually unlimited discretion
to [prolong the detention of] the driver on the basis of the slightest suspicion.... [The
Court's decision ... appears to give no weight to the citizen's interest in freedom from
suspicionless unannounced investigatory seizures."); see also James B. Jacobs & Nadine
Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutionaland Policy Critique of Drunk DrivingRoadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 595, 664 n.286 (1985) (The flaw
in Prouse, Brown, and now Sitz is that they ignore "the additional, at least equally important, purpose of the individualized suspicion requirement-to prevent unjustified invasions of individual freedom, security, or privacy. This purpose is not served by the
neutral plan' requirement.").
21 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
559 (1976)).
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Yet if the
individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do
not like the cut of his jib, if they can 'seize' and 'search' him in their discretion, we enter
a new regime.").
23 This article uses the term "accost" as it is understood by those following the
teachings of Noah Webster. According to Webster, "accost" means "to approach and
speak to," or "speak to without having first been spoken to." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 12 (Unabridged ed. 1981).
24 Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (signalling approval of a seizure
for in-the-field fingerprinting on less than probable cause for someone found on the
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fourth amendment privacy expectations regarding their public
movements. Together, these rules have had a substantial impact on
the right of locomotion. Indeed, the Court's recent cases involving
street encounters raise serious questions regarding the survival of
all citizens' freedom of movement.,
Two separate consequences of these rules are worth distinguishing. Generous interpretations of police regulations can either
render the fourth amendment inapplicable, or render its requirements satisfied. In the context of street encounters, constitutional
scrutiny is triggered only when police officers cross the mystical line
beyond which police conduct is deemed sufficiently "intimidating"
to cause a person to believe that she is not free to leave. 25 Before
this line is crossed, citizens-both the innocent and the guilty-have
no right to expect or demand freedom from a police presence that
restricts their movements.
The first category of cases discussed in Part II concerns police
activity considered to be outside the protection of the fourth
amendment. Police officers who exercise the government's right-toinquire do so without triggering fourth amendment scrutiny.
Within this line of cases, the Court expanded the concerns that originally gave birth to the right-to-inquire rule. Initially, police could
stop people on the streets only when there was probable cause to
believe a crime had been committed.26 Now police can stop and
question citizens even when there is no reason to suspect them of
criminality. 2 7 The right of the people to come and go as they
please-their right of locomotion-is no longer as broad as the people might assume.
The second category of cases concerns street encounters which
the courts have held do implicate fourth amendment protections. As
discussed below, these investigatory seizures are not controlled by
objective rules designed to constrain police discretion. Instead, the
Court looks to see if an officer has exercised common sense, and
whether the officer's actions promote effective law enforcement. If
both these requirements are satisfied, the Court will deem the officer's conduct constitutional.
A.

Much Police Activity Lies Beyond Fourth Amendment
Scrutiny
The history of the Court's decisions concerning the constitu-

streets, but disapproving of such a procedure if police would have to enter a private
home).
25
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 33-50.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 51-93.
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tionality of street encounters between police and citizens is checkered. In Terry v. Ohio28 the Court allowed a police officer, who
lacked probable cause, to question and search a citizen who the officer suspected might be armed and dangerous. Prior to Terry, the
Court had adamantly held that seizing a person with less than probable cause violated the fourth amendment.2 9 Terry and its immediate progeny blurred this clear rule. These cases expressly approved
limited investigatory stops but only on rather narrow facts. Recently, however, the Court has made plain that a broad range of
investigatory activities falls outside the purview of the fourth
amendment.
1.

The Origins of the Right-to-Inquire Rule

Under the right-to-inquire rule, law enforcement officers are
free to inquire about the public comings and goings of individuals.
This authority has been referred to by a state court as the "common-law right of inquiry." 3 0° The Supreme Court has not expressly
recognized this power. Its rulings demonstrate, however, that there
is no constitutional prohibition against this form of police
3
conduct. '
32
Justice Burton's concurring opinion in Brinegarv. United States
was the first modem articulation of the right-to-inquire rule. At issue in Brinegar was whether government agents had probable cause
33
to stop an automobile that they suspected contained illegal liquor.
While agreeing with the majority of the Court that the agents had
probable cause to search the car after Brinegar's incriminating admissions, Justice Burton found it unnecessary to decide whether
probable cause existed to stop the car prior to the inculpatory admissions. In his view, even before they heard Brinegar's incriminating statements, the agents had "a positive duty to investigate" 34
despite their lack of probable cause.
Justice Burton maintained that "[it is only by alertness to
28
29

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219 n.1, 352 N.E.2d 562, 569 n.1, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 382 n.1 (1976).
31
The Court has acknowledged that:
law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by
asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions
to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion).
32 338 U.S. 160, 178-80 (1949).
33 For a helpful discussion of Brinegar, see Lawrence P. Tiffany, Field Interrogation:
Administrative,Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DEN. U.L. REV. 389, 405-09 (1966).
34 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 178-79 (Burton, J., concurring).
30
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proper occasions for prompt inquiries and investigations that effective prevention of crime and enforcement of law is possible." 3 5 For
Justice Burton law enforcement officers were required to make a
stop when they had a mere "reasonable ground for an
36
investigation."
Justice Fortas was the next member of the Court to endorse the
right-to-inquire rule. The seldom noted case of Wainwright v. City of
New Orleans3 7 considered the legitimacy of a police officer accosting
a pedestrian who fit the description of a murder suspect. The case
also involved the right of the pedestrian to refuse to cooperate with
the police.3 8 Although the writ of certiorari in Wainwright was dismissed as improvidently granted,3 9 Justice Fortas elaborated his
opinion that there was no error in arresting Wainwright for resisting
Id. at 179.
Id. That Justice Burton is not referring to the traditional quantum of evidence
associated with the probable cause standard is reflected in the use of the phrase "reasonable ground for investigation." Id. (emphasis added). In describing the probable cause
standard, the Brinegarmajority explained that " '[tihe substance of all the definitions' of
probable cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.'" Id. at 175 (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
The Brinegarmajority also stated that "[p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Id at 175-76 (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Thus, Justice Burton's reference to
a "reasonable ground for investigation" is not the same as the majority's test that justifies police seizures of citizens travelling on the open road. Probable cause "give[s] fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection," id. at 176, but requires
"more than [a] bare suspicion." Id at 175. Justice Burton's desired standard would
have fallen below this constitutional threshold.
37 392 U.S. 598 (1968). Wainwright was a companion case to Terry. As Professor
LaFave noted: "the concurring and dissenting opinions [in Wainwright] contain some
interesting discussion" on the constitutionality of stopping citizens for investigatory
purposes. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REV. 39, 46 n.27 (1968).
38 Wainwright involved the following facts. Wainwright, a law student at Tulane
University, left his apartment around midnight to get something to eat. A short time
later, two New Orleans police officers stopped him because he allegedly fit the description of a murder suspect. Wainwright, 392 U.S. at 600 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The
so-called "description" of the wanted suspect was actually quite vague; the only solid
information the officers had was that the suspect had a tattoo on his left forearm that
said "born to raise hell." Id.
In any event, after the officers accosted Wainwright, he informed the officers that he
was a law student, gave them his address and told them he was going to get something
to eat. The officers, apparently not satisfied with Wainwright's explanation, asked him
to remove his jacket so they could see his forearm. Wainwright refused, responding that
he "would not allow himself'to be molested by a bunch of cops here on the street,' and
he 'didn't want to be humiliated by the police.'" Id. During the encounter, Wainwright
tried three times to walk peacefully away from the police, though he stopped each time
the police ordered that he do so. Eventually, Wainwright was arrested for vagrancy. Id.
at 600-01.
39 Id. at 598.
35
36
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police inquiries. Justice Fortas maintained that where there is "constitutionally adequate cause" 40 for an officer's belief that a citizen
may be a suspect, the fourth amendment does not restrain aggressive inquiries. Justice Fortas suggested that the police, in this situation, may arrest a citizen if he refuses to cooperate with a request for
4
identification. '
The central point in each opinion is that police officers are entifled to accost and question citizens when they have some reason for
investigation. Both Justice Burton and Justice Fortas assumed that
the duties of police officials require investigations into the comings
and goings of citizens. Despite the Burton and Fortas sketches of
the government's right-to-inquire, a majority of the Court nevertheless remained committed to the view that citizens' fundamental right
of free movement cannot be interrupted unless there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed.
This fourth amendment principle was altered by the landmark
case of Terry v. Ohio. 42 The Terry Court faced the issue of whether an
officer lacking probable cause could nevertheless seize and search a
citizen on the street. A strict reading of precedent by the Terry
Court would have led to a conclusion unfavorable to the traditional
law enforcement community. Prior to Teny, the Court had clearly
established that a citizen "was entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street. ' '43 And, at least
since 1925, probable cause had been the benchmark for assessing
44
the legitimacy of seizures of the person.
The Terry Court, however, was not completely isolated from the
developing, complicating, and conflicting concerns of the larger society. The Terry Court, no less than today's Court, was well aware of
the national concern with street violence. 45 The facts of Terry, for
40

Id. at 599 (Fortas, J., concurring).

41

Id. Injustice Fortas's words:
I am not prepared to say that, regardless of the presence or absence of
adequate cause for police action, the arrest or the attempt by the officers
to search is unlawful ... where the accosted person produces no identification, attempts three times to walk away, and refuses to dispel any doubt
by showing that his forearm is not tattooed. I should want to know
whether, in fact, there was constitutionally adequate cause for the police
to suspect that.the pedestrian was the man sought for murder.

Id. (emphasis added).
42
43
44

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 9.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Official conduct responsible for re-

straining a person's liberty would be considered a seizure, and could be justified only by
probable cause that criminality was existent. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983) (plurality opinion); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979).
45 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 6, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (No.
63) ("The current experiences of our own contemporary society show that the struggle
[between the community and criminals] is increasing in intensity and magnitude to the
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many, seem to typify the problems of urban crime: an officer
stopped and searched three persons who appeared to be preparing
46
an armed robbery of a downtown Cleveland store.
Thus, a conflict emerged between judicial authority establishing
that any seizure of the person required probable cause, and the public's demand that something be done to promote "law and order."
The Court attempted to satisfy everybody with its ends-oriented decision. However, in the process of reaching this decision, the Court
was forced to ignore settled constitutional precedent. On the search
question, the Court ruled that a protective frisk was permissible
where an officer had objective reasons to believe the person he confronted was engaged in criminality and was armed and presently
47
dangerous.
On the seizure issue, the Court confused matters by purposefully leaving open the question of whether an officer could accost
and stop a person on less than probable cause, while simultaneously
acknowledging that-"whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." 48 The problem, of course, was that before the Court could
logically decide whether an officer's frisk for weapons was valid, it
should have first determined whether the officer had the authority to
accost the suspect. 49 Nonetheless, the Court purported to remain
noncommital about whether an officer's approaching and addressing questions to someone on the street fell under the protective umpoint where only an unwarranted optimism can assume that our society is, or will shortly
be, victorious over its internal enemies."); Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal
Justice: The Warren Court and the CriminalCases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 538-39 (attributing
the Warren Court's "loss of impetus" to the "social and political context of the Court in
the late 1960's.... Fears of the breakdown of public order were widespread.... In the
presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering problems of crime in the United States
were represented simply as a war between the 'peace forces' and the 'criminal forces.' ")
(footnotes omitted); cf. SilasJ. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking FourthAmendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 347 (1984) (Terry Court rejected extreme positions; the Court
"took the middle road"). Academic commentary on the "stop and frisk" procedure was
extensive. See LaFave, supra note 37, at 40 n.4.
46 The Terry Court also knew that certain forms of "aggressive" police patrols were
used to harass the poor and minorities in urban areas. The Court knew not only that
many of these practices violated the fourth amendment, but also that in 'many communities field interrogations [were) a major source of friction between the police and minority groups.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.1 1 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183

(1967)).
47 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
48 Id. at 16.
49 Id at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In the first place, if the frisk is justified in
order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have
constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.") (emphasis in
original).
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brella of the fourth amendment.5 0
2.

The Post-Terry Cases: The Fourth Amendment Becomes
Inapplicable to the Right-to-Inquire

In two cases following Tery, the Court marched closer to a
right-to-inquire rule. First, in Davis v. Mississippi,-5 Justice Brennan
acknowledged for the Court that there could be occasions where the
fourth amendment would not prevent the seizure of a citizen in order to obtain his fingerprints, even where probable cause was
52
lacking.
If Davis represented a cautious first step toward the right-to50 On the one hand, the Court stated that "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id at 16.
This definition of a seizure was quite protective of fourth amendment rights, and
seemed consistent with the dynamics of most police-citizen encounters.
On the other hand, the Court later seemed to retreat from this definition when it
stated that "[o]nly when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n.16. Relying on this definition, the Court explained that it could not
determine whether a seizure had occurred prior to Detective McFadden's initiation of
physical contact with Terry, and thus assumed that "up to that point no intrusion upon
constitutionally protected rights had occurred." Id.
In a telephone conversation with the author, Professor Yale Kamisar pointed out
that the Terry Court's reluctance to address whether a seizure had occurred is explained
by the Court's eagerness to place the interest of "police safety" on the balancing scale it
employed to judge the frisk issue. According to Professor Kamisar, the Court was uncomfortable with the notion of police officers seizing and detaining individuals on less
than probable cause where the only governmental interest at stake was some vague suspicion of possible wrongdoing. Such a holding would be difficult to square with precedent, and might even cause a stir among the public.
The issue of a frisk for weapons, however, seemed easier to resolve because few
would argue against allowing police officers to take steps to protect themselves. And, of
course, where a balancing test is employed, the government's interest in "police safety"
is unlikely to be subordinated to the fourth amendment interests of an individual. Cf
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-AJUDICIAL

BIOGRAPHY 686 (1983) (ChiefJustice Warren's draft opinion in Terry "focused primarily

on the 'frisk' issue, saying little about the question of a police officer's authority to approach and stop someone on the street. Warren asserted that frisking was essential to
protect the lives of policemen as they engaged in routine investigations of suspicious
persons.").
51
394 U.S. 721 (1969).
52
Id. at 727. Justice Brennan proffered several reasons why investigatory fingerprinting was unique, and thus could be employed in a manner consistent with the fourth
amendment: fingerprinting does not involve probing a suspect's mind; when employed
in a good faith manner, fingerprinting cannot be utilized to harass a person because only
one set of prints need be taken; fingerprinting is a reliable and effective law enforcement
tool; and, because there is little danger of a suspect destroying his fingerprints, police
officials could easily seek judicial authorization for the process. Id. at 727. The Court's
discussion of fingerprinting and the fourth amendment was dictum. The Court ultirhately held that the police conduct involving the seizure and transporting of Davis to
police headquarters for fingerprinting violated the fourth amendment because it was not
authorized by ajudicial warrant, unnecessarily required two fingerprinting sessions, and
included custodial interrogation. Id. at 728.
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inquire rule, the second case, Adams v. Williams53 can be characterized as a hop, skip, and a jump. In Williams, the Court considered
whether a police officer had violated the fourth amendment when,
on the basis of an informant's tip, 54 he approached a vehicle occupied by Williams and reached into Williams's waistband to grab a
revolver that was not visible to the officer from outside the car.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist quickly disposed of
Williams's fourth amendment claims. In the process, he transformed the narrow Terry ruling into a broad permit for investigatory
searches and seizures on less than probable cause. Justice Rehnquist
declared:
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtainingmore information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.55
Applying this standard to the facts, it did not matter that the justification for seizing and searching Williams was not based on the officer's personal observations, as had been the case in Terry. 56 Nor
53 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
54 The reliability of the informant and the basis of knowledge for his allegations
against Williams were subject to considerable dispute. Speaking for the majority,Justice
Rehnquist stated that the officer knew the informant, and that the informant had "provided [the officer] with information in the past." Id. at 146. Thus, according to Justice
Rehnquist, this was a "stronger case" for police action then the situation where an officer had received an anonymous tip. Id. "The informant here came forward personally
to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene." Id. Justice Marshall's
dissent, however, noted that the only information the informant had previously provided to the officer concerned "homosexual conduct in the local railroad station." Id. at
156-57.
On the issue of the informant's credibility, Professor LaFave notes that
Justice Rehnquist appears to suggest that the giving of information on
some prior occasion, even absent any indication as to its worth, tells
something about the informer's credibility. It is by no means apparent
that this is so, and-indeed-elementary logic would suggest that such is
not the case.
3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZuRE § 9.3(e), at 477 (2d ed. 1987).

Regarding the basis of the informant's knowledge, Professor LaFave observes that
Justice Rehnquist "says nothing about the matter of underlying circumstances showing
the basis of the conclusion reached by the informant. The informant apparently did not
say that he had personally seen the narcotics and gun, nor did he give any other source
of his purported knowledge." Id. at 478. Thus, according to Professor LaFave, Williams
"seems not simply to permit a somewhat lesser showing [than the then-prevailing twoprong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)] regarding the basis of the informant's conclusions; rather, it appears to allow the officer to make a seizure without any
such showing at all." Id.
55 Williams, 407 U.S. at 145-46 (emphasis added).
56 Justice Rehnquist rejected the claim that reasonable cause for an investigatory
intrusion could only be based on an officer's personal observations. He explained that
informants' tips, like other forms of evidence, "vary greatly in their value and reliability.
One simple rule will not cover every situation." Id. at 147. The technicalities of the

1272

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1258

did it matter that Williams did not appear to pose a threat to either
the officer or anyone else in the neighborhood at the time of the
police intrusion.
Williams transformed Terry. After Williams, police officers were
free to seize and search suspicious persons to secure identification
or to "maintain the status quo" while other information was obtained. 5 7 How far the police were free to go in exercising this power
was left unknown. What was certain, however, was that probable
cause was no longer the touchstone for assessing seizures of
individuals.
3.

The Right-to-Inquire Moves Beyond the Reach of the Fourth
Amendment

Despite the Davis-Williams extension of the right-to-inquire rule,
police officers could invoke the rule only when confronting potentially dangerous or suspicious individuals. More importantly, the
Court limited the breadth of the rule by recognizing, at least implicitly, that the right-to-inquire impacted upon a citizen's right of locomotion. Police officers were not free to interfere with that right
willy-nilly; an officer was required to have objective, articulable reasons to accost someone in a public place. In 1980, however, this
requirement changed.
United States v. Mendenhall58 moved the right-to-inquire rule entirely out of fourth amendment scrutiny. At the time-Mendenhallwas
decided, Justice Stewart-its author-spoke for only two members
of the Court. Subsequently, however, the standards articulated by
Justice Stewart would command a majority. 59 The government initially argued in Mendenhall that its drug courier profile established
hearsay rule therefore do "not thwart" an officer's right-to-inquire into allegedly suspicious circumstances. Id.
57 Id. at 146.
58
59

446 U.S. 544 (1980).

In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), Justice White's plurality opinion held
that a seizure occurs when the circumstances of an encounter "amount to a show of
official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave.'" Id, at 502 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Justice
Blackmun joined the plurality regarding this standard for determining when a seizure
occurs. Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The plurality found that no seizure occurred when two Florida narcotics officers
approached and asked to see the defendant's ticket and identification at the Miami International Airport. Royer was approached because he fit a drug courier profile. Justice
White explained that "[aisking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's license
were no doubt permissible in themselves." Id. at 501. In other words, this conduct did
not trigger constitutional scrutiny.
Justice White did, however, conclude that
when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer
that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and driver's Ii-
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reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. When this argument appeared weak, a new tactic was initiated. 60 The government argued
that a police inquiry-asking a person for his identification-was not
a seizure under the fourth amendment. Speaking for only himself
and Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stewart maintained that this conduct
did not constitute a seizure, and thus did not merit fourth amendment scrutiny.
Justice Stewart asserted that precedent supported his conclusion, 61 citing Terry and Brown v. Texas. 62 He explained that Terry
had obviously been seized when Officer McFadden "took hold of
him, spun him around, and patted down the outer surfaces of
[Terry's] clothing." 63 However, Terry did not decide whether any
seizure had occurred prior to the pat down; Terry only "'assume[d]
that up to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected
rights had occurred.'-64 InJustice Stewart's view, this assumption
was entirely correct because the Constitution does not" 'prevent[] a
policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.' "65
Officer McFadden had a right-to-inquire even if he had no good reason to believe criminality was afoot.
Justice Stewart's reading of Brown v. Texas 66 presaged how far
beyond the reach of the fourth amendment the right-to-inquire rule
would be placed. In Brown, police officers observed Brown and a
companion walking away from each other in an alley located in a
high crime area of El Paso, Texas. One officer stopped Brown and
asked him to "identify himself and explain what he was doing
there." 67 When Brown refused, the officer arrested him.6 8 According to Justice Stewart, the officer's accosting of Brown, request for
identification, and demand that Brown account for his presence in
the alley did not trigger the fourth amendment. InJustice Stewart's
'69
words: "Up to this point there was no seizure."
cense and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer
was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Idt
60

See Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in 2 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND
1979-1980 132-33 (Jesse Choper, Yale Kamisar & Laurence Tribe eds.

DEVELOPMENTS

1981).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 553 (quoting Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).
Id (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring)).
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
67 Brown, 443 U.S. at 48-49.
68 At the time, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a), criminalized a person's failure to
identify himself to an officer who had "lawfully stopped him and requested the information." See Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.
69
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 556.
61
62
63
64
65
66
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With this view of the Court's precedents, it was easy to see why
Justice Stewart believed that the agent's conduct at issue in Mendenhall was not covered by the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart concluded that Mendenhall had not been seized when she was stopped
and asked to produce identification by the federal agents. According to Justice Stewart, a reasonable person in Mendenhall's position
would have believed that she was free to end the encounter. 70 The
incident occurred in a public place. The agents were not in uniform
and did not display weapons. They merely approached Mendenhall,
identified themselves as federal narcotics agents, and requested, but
did not demand to see Mendenhall's identification. 7 1 This conduct,
in Justice Stewart's view, did not constitute "an intrusion upon any
'72
constitutionally protected interest.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenhall substantially extended
the right-to-inquire rule. First, it made plain that the rule need not
be confined to situations involving "suspicious" individuals. Previously, the Terry and Williams Courts agreed that the officers' inquiries had implicated the defendants' fourth amendment rights. The
Court had sanctioned these intrusions only because the police had
reasonable suspicions to believe that the suspects were armed and
engaged in criminal conduct. In contrast, the Mendenhall plurality
found that the actions of the police in accosting and addressing
questions to a person in a public place did not implicate a citizen's
fourth amendment rights. Neither a search nor a seizure had occurred. The agents, therefore, were free to approach, stop, and address questions to Mendenhall (or anyone else) anytime they
wished.
Mendenhall also indicated the importance the Court attached to
police questioning. Justice Stewart explained that the fourth
amendment was not intended to eliminate all contact between police officers and citizens, but only" 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference' " with constitutionally protected interests. 73 He
saw no useful purpose in categorizing every police-citizen encounter
as a seizure, and emphasized the harm such an approach would have
74
upon "a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices."
70
71
72

Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. Justice Stewart did note that seizures may occur even in some situations

where the person accosted does not attempt to leave the presence of police officials. For
example, "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled,"
might justify a finding that a seizure has occurred. Id. at 554.
73

Id. at 553-54 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554

(1976)).
74

Id. at 554.
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For Stewart, the necessity of policy questioning was undoubted.
76
Two recent cases, INS v. Delgado75 and Michigan v. Chesternut,
show how the right of locomotion has been curtailed by the expanded right-to-inquire rule. These cases indicate that citizens no
longer have the right to come and go as they please; they only have
the right to be free from an unduly intimidating police presence.
Delgado upheld the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
("INS") use of factory surveys to detect the presence of illegal aliens
in American companies. In these surveys, some agents positioned
themselves at the exits of a factory, while other agents moved
throughout the building randomly questioning employees. The
agents approached each employee, identified themselves, and asked
several questions about the employee's citizenship. If credible answers were given, the questioning ceased. If the employee gave an
unsatisfactory reply or admitted that he or she was an alien, then the
77
agent requested the employee to show immigration papers.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Rehnquist began by noting
that it was unimportant that the surveys occurred in an area that was
inaccessible to the general public. 78 Because the agents were lawfully on the premises and other persons were present during the
raids, the Court held that the agents' activities would be judged by
the same criteria used to measure street confrontations.
Relying in part on earlier cases, Justice Rehnquist then asserted
that the police could question an individual without triggering constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that interrogation "by itself,
[does not] constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."' 79 Because
many people comply with police requests does not mean these encounters are coercive. A seizure occurs only when the circumstances become "so intimidating as to demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he
had not responded."8 0 Under this test, police questioning alone
does not result in a seizure, and therefore, the police are not required to show objective justification for their actions.8 1
Justice Rehnquist also rejected the claim that a surprise INS
raid constituted a seizure of the entire workforce of a factory. But
75
76
77
78

79
80

466 U.S. 210 (1984).
486 U.S. 567 (1988).
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212-13.
Id. at 217 n.5.

Ia at 216.
lId

81 Justice Rehnquist did note that "if the person refuses to answer and the police
take additional steps-such as those taken in Brown-to obtain an answer, then the
Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the
detention or seizure." Id at 216-17.
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recognizing that the unannounced surveys involved "systematic
questioning," the stationing of agents at exits, and the "disruption"
of the workplace environment, 82 Justice Rehnquist acknowledgedat least indirectly-that the workers' freedom of movement had
been restricted. This restriction, however, was constitutionally insignificant because "[o]rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the
actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary
83
obligations to their employers."
Michigan v. Chesternut8 4 showed how far the police can go to satisfy their curiosity in a street encounter before their actions trigger
fourth amendment scrutiny. On a December afternoon in metropolitan Detroit, an officer in a marked patrol car observed a man get
out of another car and approach Michael Chesternut. The officer
had seen neither of the two men before. Nor did he have reason to
suspect them of criminal activity.
When Chesternut saw the patrol car "he turned and began to
run." 8 5 The police chased Chesternut "'to see where he was going.'"86 The police then caught up with Chesternut and drove
alongside him. Eventually, Chesternut pulled packets from his
pocket, discarded them, and then stopped running. The officer arrested Chesternut after he examined the packets and found that
they contained contraband.
The Court held that the police chase did not constitute a
seizure, and thus did not implicate the fourth amendment. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun explained that brightline rules were not helpful in deciding when police investigatory
pursuits implicate fourth amendment interests. 87 Bright-line rules
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 218. Justice Rehnquist was also not bothered by the placing of agents at
the exits. The respondents had insufficient proof that the agents' intent was to "prevent
people from leaving." Id. Nothing proved that "this is what the agents at the doors
actually did. The obvious purpose of the agents' presence at the factory doors was to
insure that all persons in the factories were questioned." IM The INS agents merely
questioned workers and arrested those who were illegal aliens. "[C]itizens or aliens lawfully present" had no reason to worry that they would be seized, either inside the factory
or at the exits, if they provided "truthful answers," or even if they refused to answer the
agents' questions. Id. at 218-19.
84 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
85 Id. at 569.
86 Id.
87 The parties had provided the Court with contrasting views on the constitutional
validity of investigatory pursuits. According to the Court, the prosecution argued that a
lack of objective suspicion would not taint a police chase, "no matter how coercive, as
long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual." Id. at 572.
Chesternut maintained that the police "may never pursue an individual absent a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal activity." Id.
82
83
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were inapposite because "any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure... must take into account 'all the circumstances surrounding the incident' in each individual case." 8 8
Although he recognized the imprecision of the Mendenhall test, Justice Blackmun explained that it was more appropriate than a brightline rule because it focused on the entire incident rather than on
isolated details. 8 9
Moreover, according to Justice Blackmun, an open-ended test
provides flexibility because it lends itself to "consistent application
from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular
individual's response to the actions of the police." 9 0 In contrast to a
bright-line rule, the open-ended test "allows the police to determine
in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the
Fourth Amendment." 9 1
Applying the "reasonable person" test to the facts, the Court
ruled that the police chase did not amount to a seizure because it
"would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [their] freedom of
movement." 92 Justice Blackmun explained that the officers did not
turn on their sirens or flashers. They did not order Chesternut to
halt. Nor did they display their weapons or agressively drive their
vehicle so as to block Chesternut's path or control his speed.
Although the Court conceded that the police conduct could be
"somewhat intimidating," it "was not 'so intimidating' that [Chesternut] could reasonably have believed that he was not free to disre'9 3
gard the police presence and go about his business."
B.

Common Sense and Law Enforcement Needs Satisfy Fourth
Amendment Requirements

The Court has fashioned standards to govern police conduct
that is clearly covered by the fourth amendment, but that falls short
of a full-scale arrest or search. These standards also threaten the
right of locomotion. Although investigatory seizures directly implicate the fourth amendment, the Court does not evaluate them with
traditional fourth amendment rules. Instead, it asks whether the
seizing officer exercised common sense and whether her actions
promote effective law enforcement.
The Court will not judge police confrontations by what it con88

89
90

91
92
93

Id (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215).
Id.

Id at 574.
Id.
Id at 574-75.
Id. at 575-76 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216).
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siders to be rigid or nuanced rules that constrain officers in the field.
"Common sense," rather than technical rules, is the controlling precept. 94 In the Court's view, the fourth amendment does not prohibit intrusive actions that an individual officer reasonably believes
necessary to enforce the law. Put another way, the Court will not
second-guess police action that advances law enforcement interests
so long as the conduct is not shocking. Thus, intrusive actions that
can be termed "good police work," or that which appear to be based
on good police judgment, will be permitted even though the actions
do not fit within traditional categories of permissible police procedures. Typically, these police acts greatly impact the right of
locomotion.
The Court intimates that the common sense standard is a product of balancing. Under its traditional balancing test, the Court
weighs "the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged tojustiff the intrusion." 9 5 Although one might expect a rule based upon
balancing to contain subtle nuances and gray areas, the common
sense standard does not. Instead, it bluntly asks whether challenged
police actions promote effective law enforcement. Three cases illustrate the Court's deferential application of this standard.
1. An Investigatory Seizure: How Long Is Too Long?
United States v. Sharpe96 vividly illustrates that police intrusions
are no longer controlled by concrete rules. The issue in Sharpe was
how long an officer, who lacked probable cause to arrest, could detain a person suspected of criminal activity. The defendants urged
the Court to put a clear time limit of twenty minutes on a Terry
seizure. They argued a strict rule is necessary to ensure investiga97
tive seizures do not turn into defacto arrests.
The Sharpe majority saw no need to rigidly limit the length of
94 The "common sense" rule to which this Article refers should not be confused
with the common sense methodology proposed by Professor Cunningham. See Cunningham, supra note 10.
95 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985); see United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). Although retaining the same central meaning, this balancing
formula has been articulated slightly differently by various decisions of the Court. See
Robert Berkeley Harper, Has the Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "Reasonable Suspicion"
Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REv. 13, 24 n.85
(1988).
96 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
97
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the Court ruled that police conduct that was functionally equivalent to an arrest was unconstitutional in the absence of
probable cause.
The prosecution in Dunaway argued that custodial interrogations should be assessed
under a flexible balancing test, and that such seizures could be justified on a reasonable
suspicion of criminality. The Court rejected this argument. Id. at 212.
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investigatory seizures. The Court conceded that its earlier rulings
had caused "difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest."9 8 It also recognized that a
"bright line" rule would provide guidance to officers in the field.
These concerns, however, did not justify a strict time limitation. Instead of objective rules, "common sense" 99 governs when an investigatory seizure becomes an arrest and violates the fourth
amendment.
The Court explained, in the absence of probable cause, its focus would concentrate on "the law enforcement purposes to be
served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes." 10 0 Instead of applying tangible criteria, the
Court asked whether the police acted diligently. Applying its new
test, 0 1 the Court upheld a twenty-minute detention despite substantial evidence of police carelessness in carying out the investigation. 10 2 Moreover, the failure of the police to use less intrusive
98

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685.

99

Id.

100

IdL

101 The Court explained that its evaluation of whether a detention was too long
would consider "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to

detain the defendant." Id. at 686. For a critical review of Sharpe on this point, see Tracey Maclin, New York v. Class: A Little-Noticed Case with DisturbingImplications, 78J. CluM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 73-83 (1987).
102 See Sharpe,470 U.S. at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The facts in Sharpe would be
almost amusing if one did not fear that similar events occur more often than realized.
Drug Enforcement Agent Cooke, patrolling in an unmarked vehicle, observed a pickup
truck traveling with a Pontiac on a South Carolina highway. Cooke's suspicions were
aroused because the truck appeared heavily loaded. To obtain assistance, he had to
radio a South Carolina state trooper because other DEA agents were apparently "sleeping or eating breakfast rather than monitoring their radios for calls." Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After the officers decided to stop the vehicles, State Patrol Officer Thrasher signaled the Pontiac, the lead vehicle, to pull over. When this occurred, the pickup truck
drove between Thrasher's vehicle and the Pontiac, and continued down the highway.
Officer Thrasher then followed the truck, while Agent Cooke pulled over the Pontiac.
Cooke secured identification from Sharpe, the driver of the Pontiac. Unable to
reach Officer Thrasher, Cooke then radioed local police and requested that two officers
"maintain the situation," while Cooke left to find Thrasher. Id. at 678.
In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the truck driven by defendant Savage. Savage was "ordered out of his pickup truck at gunpoint, spread-eagled and frisked, and
questioned" by Thrasher about suspected marijuana in the truck. Id. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite the questioning, Thrasher found no grounds to arrest Savage. When Savage asked to be released, however, Thrasher prohibited him from leaving
until Agent Cooke arrived.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Cooke arrived. Cooke put his nose next to the
back of the truck and smelled marijuana. He then opened the truck and found several
bags of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marijuana. Savage was arrested, and
Cooke then returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe. Id. at 679.
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investigatory methods was not constitutionally fatal.' 0 3 The Court
acknowledged that the length of the seizure remained a consideration in the fourth amendment analysis. The Court made plain, however, that it would not endorse a rule that would jeopardize the
" 'important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to
the demands of any particular situation.' "104
2.

An Investigatory Seizure: When Is It Properfor the Police to Seize
a Person?

United States v. Hensley' 0 5 provides another example of the
Court's "common sense" approach to analyzing the validity of investigatory seizures. Police officers in Covington, Kentucky conducted a Terry stop on the basis of a "wanted flyer" issued by
another local police department. The flyer described Hensley and
explained that he was sought for investigation of a robbery in St.
Bernard, Ohio. Although the flyer warned that Hensley should be
considered armed and dangerous, the flyer. did not explain why
Hensley was suspected of being involved with the armed robbery.
Almost two weeks after the wanted flyer had been issued, Covington police saw Hensley driving a car. Radio communications
were initiated to determine whether a warrant had been issued for
Hensley's arrest. Meanwhile, Hensley was pulled over. Before leaving his patrol car, the officer was informed by the dispatcher that she
had not yet confirmed whether a warrant had issued for Hensley's
arrest. The officer approached Hensley with his weapon drawn, and
ordered Hensley and a passenger out of the vehicle. The police discovered a gun in the car, and arrested Hensley and his companion
10 6
on gun possession charges.
As framed by the Court, the question presented was whether "a
stop of a person by officers of one police department in reliance on
a flyer issued by another department indicating that the person is
wanted for investigation of a felony" was permitted under the fourth
amendment.' 0 7 Relying on dicta from an earlier case,' 0 8 the Court
103
Id. at 687. According to the Court, "[t]he question is not simply whether some
other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to
recognize or to pursue it." The Court found that the officers acted reasonably because
their actions did not involve any "delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of
the law enforcement officers." Id.
104
Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709 n.10).
105 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
106 Hensley was not arrested or convicted for the armed robbery charge that had
provided justification for seizing him in the first place. See Harper, supra note 95, at 38.
107 Hens/ey, 469 U.S. at 229.
108 The case Justice O'Connor relied upon was Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). The Whiteley Court stated in dicta that when police
officers are called to assist another department in executing an arrest warrant, the re-
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held that the fourth amendment does not prohibit officers from
stopping an individual based upon another department's flyer or
bulletin, even when neither an indepedent magistrate, nor the officer actually making the stop is apprised of the specific facts justifying the seizure. 10 9 To the Court, such a rule was a "matter of
common sense."' 10 This rule permits reduction of the amount of
information transmitted between police departments, and allows
police officers to act quickly based on information received from
other jurisdictions.
Traditional fourth amendment doctrine usually distinguishes
police intrusions based on a magistrate's authorization from warrantless intrusions."' Justice O'Connor explained that this principle had no constitutional significance in the context of street
confrontations. She rejected the argument that while it may be
proper for officers to justify an arrest on a report that a warrant has
issued, officers should not be permitted to justify an investigatory
seizure merely on a report that another department has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. For O'Connor, the latter procedure was just as reasonable as the former because it promoted law
enforcement interests while only minimally interfering with per1

2

sonal security.
Thus, officers could-relying on a flyer or bulletin-seize a suspect to check his identification, question him, or inform him that
another department sought to question him. 1 3 Moreover, because
an experienced officer might "assume" that a warrant would have
been obtained subsequent to a flyer's issuance, a flyer could "justify
a brief detention at the scene of the stop while officers checked
whether a warrant had in fact been issued." ' 1 4 Additionally, when
Hensley was stopped he exhibited no signs of dangerousness or
other criminal behavior. Nevertheless, the Court found nothing
sponding officers "are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the
magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of
probable cause." Id. at 568. The Court held that the officer who had obtained the arrest
warrant had not provided the magistrate with sufficient information to support a finding
of probable cause. Therefore,,the arresting officer who had relied upon the radio bulletin also did not have sufficient information to effectuate an arrest of Whiteley either. Id.
109 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231.
110 Id.
II1
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
112
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232.
115 Id. Justice O'Connor did not suggest that officers could legitimately stop individuals when the requesting department lacked a sufficient basis for suspecting that the
wanted individual committed a crime. Id. This concession, however, is not likely to
advance fourth amendment interests; in most cases, officers effectuating the seizure will
be unable to assess whether the requesting department had sufficient evidence to support their request.
114 Id. at 234.
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wrong with the officer approaching Hensley's vehicle with his
weapon drawn and ordering Hensley and his passenger out of the
car. This conduct "was well within the permissible range in the context of suspects who are reported to be armed and dangerous."" 15
3.

An Investigatory Seizure: How Much Evidence Is Enough
Evidence?

United States v. Sokolow 16 is the most recent example of the
Court's use of the common sense standard. Although the majority
opinion downplayed the fact, the government's so-called "drug courier profile"' " 1 7 was at stake in this case. Sokolow reaffirmed that law
enforcement officials are not required to satisfy concrete standards
regarding suspicious behavior prior to investigatory seizure of an
individual. Instead, if an officer's common sense suggests that criminality is afoot, the officer is free to effect a seizure.
The government argued in Sokolow that an officer's common
sense should determine whether there is a reasonable suspicion that
a person is engaged in drug trafficking. The government further
claimed that seizures need not be conditioned upon even circumstantial evidence of criminal behavior. 11 8 The drug courier profile
at issue was based on "probabilistic evidence," defined by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals as "personal characteristics shared by drug
couriers and the public at large, but which, when present in sufficient number, arguably serve to identify drug couriers." 1 9 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that "probabilistic evidence" alone was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminality. Predictably,
the government disagreed. 120 Finally, the government contended
that the judiciary should defer to the common sense of trained law
115 Id. at 235.
116
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
117 Id at 1587. The drug courier profile is "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980). For a thorough discussion of the profile and its
application, see Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizures by the Numbers: The Drug CourierProfile
And JudicialReview Of InvestigativeFormulas, 65 B.U.L. REv. 843 (1985). Professor Cloud
discusses how the Court's previous rulings involving the drug courier profile-Mendhall, and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)-failed to define the profile's characteristics and did not require proof of the profile's accuracy. Id at 861-69; see also Kamisar,
supra note 60, at 132-39 (arguing that the elements of the profile are insufficient to
amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior).
118
United States v. Sokolow, Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeas for the Ninth Circuit, at 20, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581
(1989) (No. 87-1295).
119 831 F.2d at 1413, 1420 (9th Cir 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). The Ninth
Circuit did rule, however, that probabilistic evidence, when sufficiently documented, can
provide the basis for a reasonable suspicion when that evidence is coupled with evidence
of ongoing criminal activity, such as evasive conduct or use of an alias. Id
120 Cf LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 69 (1987) (describing the success of
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enforcement officers in deciding who should be seized as a suspected narcotics trafficker. 12 ' The Court found this argument
22
convincing.'
Sokolow indicated that the reasonable suspicion standard should
be applied ungrudgingly in evaluation of the type of evidence that
law enforcment officials must possess before conducting a seizure.
On the quality of evidence, the Court explained that an officer is
free to use seemingly innocent behavior as a part of his calculus in
deciding to make a seizure.1 23 The Court also made clear that there
need not be a direct correlation between an officer's observations
and the suspected crime. Officers are free to rely on their common
sense to evaluate a suspect's personal appearance or habits. The
Court was unwilling to require that the factors relied upon actually
24
verify criminal conduct.'
III

A CRmTIQUE OF THE STREET ENCOUNTER CASES
Having traced the developments restricting the right of locomotion, this Article next asks whether the justifications offered by
the Court for restricting that right are consistent with the Court's
commitment to prevent arbitrary and oppressive police behavior.
This section critiques the Court's police-citizen encounter cases
from the perspective of the individual subject to a police confrontation and from a traditional legal perspective.
Solicitor General Rex Lee in persuading the Supreme Court to overturn Ninth Circuit
rulings). As Caplan recounts:
In the 1983 Term, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in
twenty-seven out of twenty-nine cases. The Justices reviewed fourteen of
those cases in part because Lee asked them to-he had filed twice as
many petitions from rulings of that circuit as he had from the next highest circuit on the list.
Id. (footnote omitted).
121
See Brief for Appellant at 37, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)
(No. 87-1295).
122 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
123

Id.

124 The ChiefJustice concluded there were adequate grounds to suspect that Sokolow was a drug courier. It was "out of the ordinary" to pay $2,100 in cash for two
airplane tickets, and even "more out of the ordinary" to pay that sum from a roll of $20
bills containing nearly twice that amount of cash. Id- The Chief'Justice also felt that the
facts-although "by no means conclusive"-were sufficient "to warrant consideration"
that Sokolow was traveling under an alias. Id. Finally, the ChiefJustice explained that
Sokolow's destination-Miami-while not ordinarily suspicious in itself, was cause for
concern due to the brevity of Sokolow's trip. Id. When considered together, these factors provided sufficient suspicion for a seizure, even though each factor by itself was not
indicative of criminality, and particular factors match the characteristics of many innocent travellers.
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The Right-to-Inquire Rule and Fourth Amendment
Principles

Neither the basic premises of the right-to-inquire nor its impact
on the right of locomotion has been analyzed. This subsection will
analyze several neglected objections to the right-to-inquire rule.
First, there is no constitutional or precedential authority for the
original rule or its later manifestations. In the Court's rush to sanction the rule, it ignored established precedents and standards securing the freedom of movement that the fourth amendment
guarantees all citizens. Second, the right-to-inquire rule does not
check police discretion. Proponents of the rule, both on and off the
Court, have yet to demonstrate how the rule can be employed without leaving citizens at the mercy of the police. Third, pressure to
retain and expand the rule has forced the Court to adopt unrealistic
and deceptive standards to resolve the question of when a person
has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Finally, the right-to-inquire rule has always been more concerned with
police interests than with the rights of citizens. This perspective undermines the fourth amendment, which emphasizes the rights of the
individual, not police efficiency.
1.

The Right-to-Inquire Rule and Precedent

The first objection to the right-to-inquire rule concerns its doctrinal foundation. Because the Court never explained the basis for
the original rule, it has never had to justify the rule's subsequent
expansion. As a result, subsequent and drastic manifestations of the
rule appear to flow naturally from a standard that was never reconciled with the fourth amendment. Moreover, this inattention to history and precedent-begun in Terry-established a trend that has
been carried too far.
Justice Burton's call for a right of inquiry in Brinegar had no
support in Court precedent when it was made. 125 As the Brinegar
majority recognized, the Court's prior cases had emphatically stated
that all persons were free to travel the Nation's streets without interruption or search, unless there was probable cause to believe that
125

Although the Court had not endorsed seizures on less than probable cause, the

authors of the Uniform Arrest Act proposed that police officers be permitted to stop any
person who they reasonably suspected had committed, or was about to commit a crime.
An officer would be permitted to detain the suspect and "demand of him his name,
address, business abroad and whither he is going." See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 321 (1942) (quoting § 2(1) of the Uniform Arrest Act).
Professor Foote has described why this section of the Uniform Arrest Act is inconsistent
with fourth amendment principles. See Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51 J. Cram. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sc. 402, 404-05
(1960).
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the detained person had committed a crime.' 2 6 Twenty years after
Brinegar,Justice Fortas raised the issue again in Wainwright.' 2 7 By
this time, the Court was well on its way to granting the police broad
new powers in Terry. The Court, however, still had not established
either an historical or a precedential basis for police interruptions
and seizures of a person without probable cause.
Indeed, when the Court squarely confronted the issue in Terry,
its prior cases pointed toward rejecting government claims that an
officer could stop and question a citizen based upon behavior shy of
probable cause. A decade before Terry, in Henry v. United States,128
the Court stated that probable cause had always been an essential
linchpin of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The Court explained
that cases decided both before and after adoption of the fourth
amendment established that "common rumor or report, suspicion,
or even 'strong reason to suspect' " was not a sufficient basis to justify the seizure of an individual.' 2 9 In the years between Henry and
126 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); see also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). For an interesting historical discussion of the
power of the police to detain for investigation on less than probable cause, see Brief for
the NAACP Legal Defense And Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 12-20, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67) [hereinafter Brief for the NAACP].
127 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. In the interim betweenjustice Burton's and Justice Fortas's opinions on a right of inquiry, Justice Clark, in a brief dissent
joined by Chief Justice Warren, took the position that the fourth amendment did not
preclude stopping the occupants of an automobile whose "suspicious activities" were
observed during a prolonged surveillance by government agents. See Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Professor Tiffany has shown that the government's brief in Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253 (1960), "took the position that the Court should give express recognition
to the right of police officers to stop persons for interrogation when adequate grounds
for an arrest do not exist." Tiffany, supra note 33, at 402.
For an argument that Rios represented a clear "repudiation" of the underlying
premises of the stop and frisk and right to inquire rules, see Brief for the NAACP, supra
note 126, at 20 n.36.
128 Henry, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
129
Id at 101 (footnote omitted). For criticism of Henry's conclusion on this point,
see Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics of Illinois v.
Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 494 n.197 (1984).
For a more general criticism of Henry that takes issue with the "all or nothing approach" that required the police to have probable cause before investigating suspicious
activities, see Edward L. Barrett, Jr., PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 59-67. Professor Barrett criticized the pre-Terry state of
fourth amendment jurisprudence involving street detentions. He argued that cases like
Henry and Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), put pressure on the police "to
make arrests too early in the investigative process," id at 66, and at the same time, did
not allow the police sufficient leeway to investigate suspicious activities unless they had
probable cause for arrest. Professor Barrett argued the police should be free to conduct
what he considered to be "relatively minor interference[s]" with personal liberty where
they had sufficient grounds for suspecting criminality. Id. at 64. It should be noted,
however, that Professor Barret's "balancing" approach also generated scholarly criticism. See Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study inJudicial Control of the Police), 58
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 433, 448-49 (1967).
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Terry, the Court twice reaffirmed the principle that probable cause
was required to validate a seizure of the person. 3 0° Thus, Justice
Douglas had the weight of authority on his side when, dissenting in
Terry, he insisted that the police were constitutionally required to
3
possess probable cause before effectuating a seizure.' 1
Davis v. Mississippi 132 and Adams v. Williams,13 3 the immediate
offspring of Teny, also played "fast and loose" with precedent; in
the process, both cases solidified and expanded the right-to-inquire
rule. In Davis, Justice Brennan should have seen that the government's interest in obtaining the fingerprints of those only vaguely
suspected of a crime was far less compelling than the government
interest at stake in Terry. i 3 4 In Terry, immediate and compelling interests in crime prevention and officer safety arguably justified an
exception to the fourth amendment's traditional safeguards.' 35 Da36
vis, of course, involved no comparable circumstances.'
130 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261
(1960). The Burger Court was well versed in this history. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 507 (1983) (plurality opinion); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1979).
131 Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas complained that
thC upshot of Terry is "that the police have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and
conduct a 'search' than a judge has to authorize such action." Id. at 36.
132
394 U.S. 721 (1969); see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
'33 407 U.S. 143 (1972); see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
134 As commentators have noted, Terry involved a special "rubric of police conduct,"
392 U.S. at 20, that went beyond a general interest in law enforcement. See, e.g., LaFave,
supra note 37, at 66 (Terry expressly deals only with the prevention of crime, and not with
the detection of crime; Officer McFadden "feared that a crime was about to be
committed.").
135 A concern for police safety undoubtedly motivated Justice Harlan's comment
that "[t]here is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person
suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the
answer might be a bullet." Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also B.
ScHwARTZ, supra note 50, at 685-93 (describing various draft opinions in Terry that focused on the authority of police officers to frisk persons even in the absence of probable
cause).
justice Harlan and the Court were quite right to be concerned with officer safety.
However, Justice Harlan's comments do not show full appreciation of the other side of
police confrontations. Professor Schwartz demonstrated-at least in the New York cases
decided prior to Terry-that the police frisk was "generally used for much more than
self-protection." Schwartz, supra note 129, at 443-44 (police use frisks to gather evidence, confiscate weapons, and to maintain image of authority on the streets). This
"invisible" side of police frisks has been, and continues to be, abused by police officers.
See Peter S. Canellos, Police Searches Questioned, Boston Sunday Globe, Jan. 14, 1990, at 1,
col. 1.
136 Indeed, 16 years after Davis was decided, Justice Brennan noted that the law
enforcement interests that supported the holding in Terry were inapposite to support the
intrusion associated with in-the-field fingerprinting. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 819
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Moreover, the balancing formula that is typically asserted to justify investigatory
seizures is especially dangerous to fourth amendment values. Cf. Barrett, supra note
129. According to Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, the precedent for this balancing model was
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camarasanctioned the use of adminis-
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In Williams, Justice Rehnquist asserted:
Teriy recognizes that it may be the essence of good'police work to
adopt an intermediate response.... A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtainingmore information, may be most reason37
able in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.'
Terry, however, provided no support for the notion that the fourth
amendment permits the police to adopt an "intermediate response"
whenever they are investigating supposedly suspicious persons.
The only intermediate response approved in Terry was the use of a
frisk for weapons when an officer believed he was confronting an
armed person.1 3 8 Terry never authorized a general power to investi39
gate suspicious persons.'
Although Williams's distortion of Terry is regrettable, its approval of a police right to seize suspicious persons in order to check
trative search warrants not supported by the traditional quantum of probable cause required for criminal searches. Id. at 538-39. A balancing process may be legitimate in the
administrative search context. See Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 20. However, in street
encounter cases, using a balancing process "stacks the cards" against the fourth amendment.
In the last decade, prosecutors have had little trouble persuading the Court that the
public's interest in law enforcement and police safety justifies relaxing fourth amendment protections. The one notable exception to this phenomenon was Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47 (1979), discussed infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
The government's success before the Court should have come as no surprise.
Whenever the Court balances the competing interests involved in investigatory intrusions, the government's interests will always be substantial and will likely seem more
compelling than those of the defendant, at least to the Court. Indeed, one would hardly
expect the Court to sympathize with the fourth amendment interests of those typically
subjected to police confrontations. Cf. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman,
The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 100 (1988) (judges are
unlikely to reflect popular opinions since "judicial decisions simply reflect the judgments ofjudges-judgments based on their own values and their own assessments about
whether people like themselves will suffer privacy losses.").
Unfortunately, when the Court's balancing formula is so predictably slanted in favor
of the government, and the potential for abuse by police officials is obvious, the balancing process itself can no longer be relied upon to produce legitimate results. Cf. Amsterdam, infra note 154, at 437 (When police officials extend their power under the stop
and frisk doctrine in excess of legitimate needs for safety, "the power makes the intrusion without justification and destroys the balance.").
137
Williams, 407 U.S. at 145-46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
138 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
139
SeeJohn M. Burkoff, Non-InvestigatoryPolice Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
681, 684 (1978) (Terry approved only the narrowest class of investigative seizures; it did
not sanction strategic or preventive encounters). Indeed, the Court itself recognized the
narrowness of Teny's actual holding in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969) (per
curiam). In Morales, the Court noted that the New York Court of Appeals' ruling that the
police "may detain [persons] for custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a
traditional arrest ... goes beyond our.., decisions in Terry v. Ohio and Sibron v. New York
and is claimed by petitioner to be at odds with Davis v. Mississippi." Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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identification or gather information debilitates the view of the
140
fourth amendment established in Brinegar v. United States.
A comparison of Williams and Brinegarreveals how far the rightto-inquire rule undermines the fourth amendment's protection
against arbitrary police tactics. Justice Rutledge explained in Brinegar that the probable cause rule was intended to "safeguard citizens
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime." 14 1 He acknowledged that police are
often confronted with dubious conduct while on patrol, and constitutional standards must therefore make room for mistakes. 14 2 "But
the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability."' 143 A lesser requirement would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
14 4
officers' whim or caprice."'
In a key passage, Justice Rutledge stated that the "troublesome
line" often posed is deciding "between mere suspicion and probable
cause."' 145 According to Justice Rutledge, "[t]hat line necessarily
must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the
particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances."' 146 In the end, however, where a citizen manifests "no
good cause" for the police to believe he is engaged in criminality,
although he acts suspiciously, he "is entitled to proceed on his way
without interference." 147
The essence ofJustice Rutledge's discussion was that the fourth
amendment safeguards the liberty and personal security of individuals from all unreasonable police intrusions. When a person leaves
the privacy of his home, he does not leave behind his fourth amendment rights. Instead, the amendment assures the citizenry a right of
locomotion, which means the right to come and go free from unfounded police intrusions. According to Brinegar, although the line
separating mere suspicion and probable cause may be blurred at
times, especially in street encounters, the judiciary must provide a
demarcation point. Only those intrusions premised upon sufficient
facts pointing to probable guilt fall on the constitutional side of the
48
line.'
338 U.S. 160,'reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949).
Id.at 176 (emphasis added).
Id. For a recent application of the Court's willingness to tolerate "reasonable"
mistakes in the fourth amendment context, see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79
(1987).
143 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
144 Id.
145
Id (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147
Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
148
See Brief for the NAACP, supra note 126, at 27. The NAACP asserted:
140
141
142
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Furthermore, Justice Rutledge's distinction between probable
cause and mere suspicion cannot be dismissed just because Williams
involved a brief stop, while Brinegar involved a full-scale search and
arrest. The issue in Brinegar was whether government agents had
sufficient grounds even to stop Brinegar's car. Under the Court's
reasoning, if probable cause did not exist, Brinegar would have
1 49
been "entitled to proceed on his way without inteference.'
Nor did Justice Rehnquist explain in Williams why Brinegar'sreasoning is no longer pertinent. In either the initial stages of an arrest
or the first steps in securing the identificaton of a citizen, if an officer's actions are premised on only a suspicion of wrongdoing, in
the end, the citizen is left at "the mercy of the officers' whim or
caprice." 150 The facts in Williams illustrate this point. Although the
Probable cause is addressed bluntly to the issue of particularizedjustification that is the Fourth Amendment's first principle. As it has developed
judicially, the phrase connotes exactly that quantum of evidence pointing
to likely or probable guilt that serves to single out an individual reasonably persuasively from the mass of men. It is the standard designed to
distinguish him from Everyman with sufficient sureness that, if the individual's arrest or search be authorized, Everyman's arrest or search will
not be authorized by parity of reasoning.
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
150 Id. at 176. One noteworthy example of how the expansive language in Adams v.
Williams has been used to authorize police searches broader than that contemplated by
Teny is State v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 846
(1980). Flynn held that the fourth amendment did not preclude a police officer, who had
reasonable suspicion for detaining two suspects, from forcibly seizing and searching the
wallet of one of the suspects in order to check his identification. Id. at 448-49, 285
N.W.2d at 718-20. Reasonable suspicion was based on the fact that Flynn's companion,
Daniel Liesch, fit the description of the suspect in a nearby burglary. Id. at 431, N.W.2d
at 711. Liesch complied with the officer's request for identification, but Flynn refused.
The officer then explained his reasoning for requesting Flynn's identification, but Flynn
still refused to comply with the request "becoming verbally abusive as he did so." Id. at
431, 285 N.W.2d at 712. The officer then frisked Flynn and removed a wallet and a pair
of long-nosed pliers from Flynn's pocket. Id. at 431-32, 285 N.W.2d at 712. A search of
the wallet revealed Flynn's identity. A radio check established that Flynn was wanted for
an earlier crime, and the officer arrested him. Id
After determining that the officer had reasonable grounds for frisking the suspects
for weapons, the Wisconsin Supreme Court then addressed whether a search for identification was permissible where the police lacked probable cause of criminal conduct. Id
at 436-37, 285 N.W.2d at 714. Relying on both the assertion in Williams, 407 U.S. at
145-46, that "[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information" might be
reasonable under certain conditions, and Wisconsin's stop and identify law, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 968.24 (West 1989), which authorizes an officer who reasonably suspects that a
person has committed a crime to "demand the name and address of th[at] person and an
explanation of his conduct," the court concluded that a search for identification did not
violate the fourth amendment. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d at 441, 285 N.W.2d at 716. The court
reasoned:
[U]nless [an] officer is entitled to at least ascertain the identity of the suspect, the right to stop him can serve no useful purpose at all.... Ignorant
of even the person's name, the officer must either attempt to follow the
149
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Court sought to establish that seizing a suspicious person in order
to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo was reasonable, it chose the wrong case to illustrate the rule. As Justice Marshall's dissent noted, it was "clear that the officer intended to make
the search as soon as he approached [Williams]. [The officer] asked
suspect in the hope that he will discover some clue as to his identity, or
surrender the potential lead and continue his investigation along other
lines. Particularly where the officer is confronted with a number of potential suspects, limiting his options in this manner could have a perplexing effect on law enforcement efforts.
Id. at 442, 285 N.W.2d at 716 (footnote omitted).
The court went on to note that acceptance of Flynn's claim that "the officer can stop
[a] suspect and request identification, but that the suspect can turn right around and
refuse to provide it" would reduce the authority granted to police officers by Williams
and Wisconsin's stop and identify law to a "mere fiction." Id. at 444, 285 N.W.2d at
717-18.
The court also thought it "significant" that Flynn could have "substantially avoided
the intrusion simply by producing the identification himself as his companion did.... It
was his unreasonable refusal to do so that led to the police conduct of which he now
complains." 1d. at 448, 285 N.W.2d at 719. This sort of reasoning is inevitable when the
Supreme Court plays "fast and loose" with fourth amendment principle; the message
sent to state and lower federal courts is that they can do the same. First, the result
sanctioned in Flynn flies directly in the face of Court precedent. Although the Wisconsin
Supreme Court thought otherwise, id at 449, 285 N.W.2d at 720, its decision in Flynn
contradicts the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
93-94 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980), which stated unambiguously that
"[n]othing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized 'cursory search for weapons' or, indeed, any search whateverfor anything but weapons." (emphasis added).
Ybarra cannot be distinguished by claiming that it did not address the narrower issue presented in Flynn. Ybarra made it absolutely plain that where probable cause of
criminal behavior is absent, a search of person is permissible only where the police believe a suspect is armed and presently dangerous. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93. If a search
for weapons is prohibited absent a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous, a search for identification is equally impermissible (if not more so) because the
government's interest in protecting the officer's safety-the only interest which justifies
the search-is not implicated in a search for identification.
Second, the result in Flynn cannot be defended because of the so-called "need" for
the particular intrusion involved, or the "perplexing effect" a contrary rule would have
for law enforcement. Cf 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 54, § 9.4(g), at 544. Professor LaFave
argued:
But even though some detentions for investigation must be terminated as
inconclusive, termination without even ascertaining the identity of the
suspect is another matter. Without even that bit of information, subsequent apprehension of the released suspect, if he is later shown to have
perpetrated the suspected crime or some other offense, will usually be
impossible.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The "necessity" argument is always attractive because fourth amendment cases generally involve unattractive characters. However, "[t]he needs of law enforcement stand
in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain
exercises of official power." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973). It is a truism that fourth amendment safeguards undermine certain law enforcement activities. That is the point of the provision. Blaming the victim of an unconstitutional police intrusion is hardly a convincing analysis.
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no questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched."' 15
In its rush to secure a rule permitting the police the right-toseize, Williams, like Davis and Tery before it, refused to follow the
Court's precedents dealing with seizures of citizens. Unfortunately,
the Court did not bother to examine either the rule's origin or its
impact on the right of locomotion. Perhaps the Court's oversight
was intentional. Recognizing a broad right-to-inquire rule inevitably would conflict with fundamental constitutional precepts. Nevertheless, the Court may have believed the benefit of the rule was
worth the cost in constitutional freedom. Sanctioning a right-to-inquire rule ushered in a "new regime"; 152 the individual on the street
could no longer look to the fourth amendment as guaranteeing a
right of locomotion.
2.

The Right-to-Inquire Rule Does Not Check Police Discretion

A second objection to the right-to-inquire rule is its failure to
sufficiently check police discretion. Although commentators have
disagreed on the relevance of the fourth amendment's historical
background to today's law enforcement problems, 153 most agree the
provision was intended to protect the citizenry from unjustified and
arbitrary intrusion by the government. 154 The Court's development
151 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 155 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
152
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
153 Some scholars have argued that the original intent of the framers of the fourth
amendment provides scant help in resolving current constitutional dilemmas. See, e.g.,
Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 136, at 85 ("[Tihere is no way to know how the
framers would make [the] assessment [of what makes a search or seizure reasonable] in
our crime-riddled society, in which, for many, the greatest threat to privacy is criminals,
not the police.").
Others commentators have looked to the broad concerns that motivated the framers
in order to resolve specific fourth amendment questions that currently arise. See, e.g.,
Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Tindpled Basis" Rather
Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 578 (1983) ("The likely
explanation for the failure of the fourth amendment to provide explicitly for an 'exclusionary rule' is that the framers thought little, if at all, about after the fact judicial control.") (emphasis in original); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1229, 1239-40 (1983) ("The single theme running through the entire history of the fourth amendment is arbitrariness.... [I]t did not
matter whether the search was unreasonable because of an improper warrant or otherwise. Indeed, since unreasonable searches frequently occur without a warrant, it was
prudent of the framers to protect against them.") (footnotes omitted).
154
Professor Amsterdam has explained that the framers of the fourth amendment
sought to prohibit "indiscriminate" government intrusions for two reasons:
The first is that they expose people and their possessions to interferences
by government when there is no good reason to do so. The concern here
is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the principle that
every citizen is entitled to security of his person and property unless and
until an adequate justification for disturbing that security is shown. The
second is that indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the
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and application of a right-to-inquire rule allows unjustified police
intrusions, thus jeopardizing the historic values underlying the
fourth amendment.
From its inception, the right-to-inquire rule was flawed because
the Court provided little guidance on how the rule would work
within the dynamics of a police-citizen encounter. In Brinegar,Justice Burton stated that the public interest in law enforcement requires the police to investigate whenever there are reasonable
grounds for an investigation.15 5 While Justice Burton's words may
be stirring, his judicial reasoning is unconvincing. The facts justifying a stop of Brinegar were, at best, slim.' 5 6 In essence, Brinegar
was seized because he had a reputation for running liquor.' 5 7 Justice Burton, however, contended that the agents' aggressive conduct
was appropriate because it interrupted a criminal act, and that noth58
ing had occurred to lessen the original suspicion of the agents.'
This reasoning begs the question. Justice Burton simply assumed that it is constitutionally reasonable to seize citizens with unsavory reputations. Justice Burton concluded that once the agents
decided that Brinegar's reputation as a bootlegger justified the stop,
they were free to use almost any means to accomplish their mission.
This included forcing Brinegar's car off the road and interrogating
him to the point of eliciting a supposedly "voluntary response"' 15 9
that his car contained some liquor.' 60 Apart from the fifth amendment concerns raised by this conduct,' 6 ' fourth amendment interdiscretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously
in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This latter concern runs
against arbitrarysearches and seizures: it condemns the petty tyranny of
unregulated rummagers.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 411
(1974) (emphasis in original).
155 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 179 (1949).
156 Federal agents had spotted Brinegar's car traveling west a few miles from the
Missouri-Oklahoma line. Id at 162. One of the agents had arrested Brinegar five
months earlier for illegally transporting liquor, although that arrest had not yet resulted
in a conviction on any charges, and its validity had not been resolved. Id. at 186 (Jackson, J., dissenting). This same agent, on two occasions, had seen Brinegar loading liquor into a car in Joplin, Missouri, a perfectly legal act since Missouri was not a "dry"
state. Id. at 168. The only objective fact offered by the agents was that Brinegar's car
appeared "heavily loaded" and "weighted with something," id. at 163, a claim that is
essentially unreviewable.
157 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 96 (1966).
158 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 179.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 178.
161
Professor EdwinJ. Butterfoss, in his Article BrightLine Seizures: The Needfor Clarity
in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437
(1988), provides an excellent analysis of the fifth amendment concerns presented in police-citizen encounters. He describes how courts have "greatly expanded the category of
nonseizures by ignoring the fifth amendment implications of encounters involving an
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ests suffer when the police are licensed to utilize coercive tactics
whenever their suspicions are aroused. As JusticeJackson observed
in dissent, when the agents "ditched" Brinegar's car, "they were
either taking the initial steps in arrest, search and seizure, or they
16 2
were committing a completely lawless and unjustifiable act."'
Justice Fortas's version of the right-to-inquire provides no better check on police discretion. In Wainwright, he argued that where
there is "adequate cause"' 63 for believing a citizen fits the description of a suspect, the fourth amendment does not prevent aggressive police inquiries. Justice Fortas, however, never explained the
meaning of "adequate cause." He suggested that the officers who
accosted Wainwright had sufficient information to question him.
This suggestion seems implausible; the police department conceded
that the arresting officers could not have identified the wanted murder suspect even if they saw him.' 6 4 Wainwright was accosted, and
eventually arrested, because he vaguely resembled a suspect whom
165
the officers themselves could not have identified.
Under traditional standards, Wainwright's arrest was a blatant
violation of the fourth amendment. Justice Fortas, however, used a
right-to-inquire rule to analyze the police actions. He found nothing improper with the arrest of Wainwright after he failed to produce sufficient identification, 16 6 and refused to let the police
individual suspected of criminal activity." Id at 441. Professor Butterfoss explains that
an officer's aim in the typical encounter is "to have the suspect incriminate herself 'voluntarily' by confessing, providing an explanation that heightens the level of suspicion,
or consenting to a search." Id. at 468.
Justice Brennan has also discussed the fifth amendment problems associated with
Terry seizures. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 44-46 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For other academic commentary on this point, see George E. Dix, NonArrest Investigatory
Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 849, 937-58; LaFave, supra note 37, at
93-109; Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161
(1966); Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 585, 597-615 (1981) (authored by Nicholas C. Harbist).
162 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 187-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
163
Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 599 (1968).
164
See Record at 24-25, Wainwright (No. 13) (testimony of Lieutenant Francis Martello) ("Q. Were there any members of the New Orleans Police Department who, to
your knowledge, could have identified this murder suspect had they seen him? A. No.
Not by sight but by investigation. In the line of investigation.").
165 See Record at 36-37 (testimony of OfficerJohn Ottesen) ("Q. Why did you notify
the Detective Bureau? A. They had specifically asked us to check the vicinity of the
French Quarter for a suspect wanted in a murder case. Q. Why did you call them? A.
Suspect fitted [sic] the description of the wanted subject. Q. Did you call them to send
someone? A. They had a better knowledge of the person than we had.").
166 The police stopped Wainwright on the street. He "told the officers that he had
identification at home but not on his person. He gave them his name and address, and
informed them he was a law student and was on his way to get something to eat." Wainwright, 392 U.S. at 600 (Warren, CJ., dissenting). Thus, Justice Fortas was not entirely
correct when he stated that Wainwright "produce[d] no identification." Id. at 599 (For-
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examine his body in order to dispel their suspicions.' 6 7 Justice Fortas flirted with the view that anyone accosted by the police on the
street had better be prepared to fully submit to police orders, or
risk the "serious personal intrusion" associated with an arrest and
trip to the stationhouse. 168 Under this view, acquiesence to police
orders is required "regardless of the presence or absence of ade169
quate cause for police action."
A quick response to this disturbing reasoning is that one should
not and "cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an
70
officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution.'
Justice Fortas's position reveals the potential for abuse inherent in
the right-to-inquire rule. If the police know that they are free to
groundlessly accost citizens, and that any resistance to these arbitrary stops permits arrest, the temptation to use this authority will
be considerable. 171 The likely reward for those few citizens courageous enough to resist the police' 7 2 will be the indignity of arrest.
The rest of society, innocent and guilty, will be required to submit
to arbitrary insults to individual sovereignty.' 73 This cannot be the
tas, J., concurring). Wainwright's problem was not that he produced "no identification," but that the officers believed that the identification he provided was insufficient to
dispel their subjective suspicions.
167 Had the police examined Wainwright's body, they would have found that his left
forearm did not have a tattoo.
168
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,428 (Powell, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 979 (1976).
169
Wainwight, 392 U.S. at 599 (Fortas, J., concurring).
170
Id. at 614 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wright v Georgia, 373 US. 284, 29192 (1963)); cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 45 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In DeFillippo, a Detroit ordinance criminalized a person's refusal to identify himself to a
police officer where the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person's conduct
warranted further investigation. Justice Brennan argued that the ordinance "commands
that which the Constitution denies the State power to command and makes 'a crime out
of what under the Constitution cannot be a crime.' " Id. at 45 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971)).
171
Cf Schwartz, supra note 129, at 453 n.146 (describing how police officers do not
necessarily mind resistance during investigatory detentions, and, at times, may even encourage it).
172
That few persons are willing to disregard a police officer was vividly recounted in
Professor H. Richard Uviller's recent book, TEMPERED ZEAL (1988). Professor Uviller's
observations reveal that the "[m]anifest confidence [exuded by the police] begets submission, and the cops learn the firm tone and hand that informs even the normally aggressive customer of the futility of resistance. It's effective. In virtually every encounter
I have witnessed, the response of the person approached was docile, compliant, and
respectful." Id. at 16.
173 JusticeJackson's comments on the fragility of citizens' personal security cogently
illustrate the point. He noted that under our constitutional system, "freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there
is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). He explained that
an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by
surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervi-
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174
scenario envisioned by the framers of the fourth amendment.
Of course, some contend that ensuring the safety of police officers warrants granting individual officers substantial discretion to
decide how a particular investigation should proceed. 7 5 Society
unarguably has a strong interest in protecting police officers when
they are investigating criminal activity. What is debatable, however,
is whether society's need for effective law enforcement requires presumably innocent citizens to obey all police officers' commands. No
one has shown that the police need this amount of authority to
safely fulfill their duties. What the Court has overlooked, and continues to ignore, is that the power given to officers in cases like Wil17 6
liams is subject to considerable abuse.
When an officer has legitimate grounds for taking custody of a
person, she should be provided sufficient leeway to respond to the
exigencies of the situation.17 7 But when the officer lacks any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, surely a citizen's refusal to

sion and limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers whose
own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There is no
opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The
citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or
to resist at risk or arrest of immediate violence.
Id.
See Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 400. Professor Amsterdam asserted:
But the authors of the Bill of Rights had known oppressive government .... I believe they meant to guarantee to their survivors the right to
live as free from every interference of government agents as our condition would permit. And, to this end, it seems to me that the guarantee
against unreasonable 'searches and seizures' was written and should be
read to assure that any and every form of such interference is at least
regulated by fundamental law so that it may be "restrained within proper
bounds."
Id. (quoting Patrick Henry in 3 JONATHAN ELuoT, DEBATES 448-49 (2d ed. 1891)).
175 This concern undoubtedly influenced the Court in Williams, where justice Rehnquist emphasized that the suspect "rolled down his window, rather than complying with
the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily
be seen." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
176 The experience of Don Jackson, a black Los Angeles, California police officer
provides a vivid and disgusting example of what can happen to someone who ignores a
police officer's command. Jackson, while off-duty, was videotaped by an NBC camera
crew as he was pushed head-first into a store window and pounded against a police
vehicle after he refused to obey an officer's command to place his hands on his head.
Jackson was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over by Long Beach, California
police officers for allegedly weaving and crossing over the center line on Martin Luther
King Boulevard in Long Beach. The videotape of the incident, aired on NBC's "Today"
program, flatly contradicts police claims that the vehicle Jackson was riding in violated
any traffic regulations. Additionally, it shows no support for any claim thatJackson represented a threat to the officer, unless one exhibits danger by refusing to obey an arbitrary police order. See Bill Girdner, Charge of Racism by Calif.Police Is Latest in Long Line,
Boston Globe, Jan. 19, 1989, at 3; Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to My Peaple, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at A25.
177
Of course, even where an officer has probable cause to arrest, the officer's actions must comply with the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. "[I]t is
174
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comply with the officer's command is no justification for escalating
the intrusiveness of the encounter.
Advocates of a right-to-inquire rule have never reconciled the
contradiction between police officers' authority to pursue investigatory seizures and the fourth amendment's mission of adequately
checking official discretion. Justice White, a strong proponent of
the rule, has always believed that the fourth amendment does not
limit a police officer's right to accost and question a person in public. 178 Furthermore, Justice White believes an officer's authority expands considerably where "proper circumstances" exist.' 79 Indeed,
forJustice White these circumstances permit a frisk even if no questions are asked.' s0
The difficulty with this approach is defining "proper circumstances." Do proper circumstances exist where an unknown black
male walks late at night in an all-white suburb?' 8 ' Do they exist
where officers observe a person resembling a murder suspect, and
the person refuses to cooperate when the officers demand that he
account for his presence? 8 2 Are protective frisks appropriate where
two officers encounter a group of youths loitering on the street in a
neighborhood known for drug and gang violence among teenagers?
In this last case, Justice White's opinions suggest that a frisk will be
constitutional even if the officers ask no questions before the frisk,
and find no weapons.' 8 3
In each of these situations, the police lack any specific justification to make a stop-other than their own bias or subjective
views.' 8 4 Yet, today, when many law-abiding persons feel afraid to
plain that reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is
carried out." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (emphasis added).
178 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
179 Terry, 392 U.S. at 34-35.
180

Id.

Cf. Dan Stormer & Paul Berstein, The Impact of Kolender v. Lawson on Law Enforcement and Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105 n.4 (1984) (detailing the
testimony of one police officer who described how he saw Lawson "dancing" on the
street). In Lawson, the officer then detained and questioned Lawson. Later the officer
testified: "'I thought if a pedestrian was to walk by, possibly just by [Lawson's] actions
or what I observed, that [Lawson] could have assaulted a pedestrian.'"
182
Cf. Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 599 (1968) (FortasJ., concurring).
183
Terry, 392 U.S. at 34-35 (A frisk may "serve preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has been aroused." Justice White's comments on the
beneficial aspects of certain types of "aggressive patrol" practices by the police may have
been intended to separate himself from the Teny majority's cautious criticism of such
police practices. See id. at 12-15.).
184
Professor Davis has documented how the subjectivity of individual officers can
influence law enforcement practices. See KENNETH DAVIs, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).
Professor Davis described how many Chicago police officers divided society into two
classes of people: "the 'kinky' (criminal) class and the law-abiding class. The officers
181
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walk the streets of their own neighborhoods, too many will feel that
"proper circumstances" almost always exist.1 8 5
3.

The Right-to-Inquire Rule's Distortion of the Meaning of Seizure

The right-to-inquire rule has forced the Court to adopt unrealistic and deceptive standards for deciding when a person has been
seized for fourth amendment purposes. Analysis in this area has
produced holdings that undermine the principle of reasoned
decisionmaking.
The roots of the problem can be traced to Terry. In Terry, the
government argued that police conduct that detains a person, but
falls short of a traditional arrest, is not a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The Terry Court "emphatically reject[ed] this notion."1 8 6 It explained that "whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person."' 18 7 Although the Court stressed this definition
of "seizure," it did not clearly apply its definition to the facts at
hand. The Court claimed that it could not determine whether any
seizure occurred before Officer McFadden physically contacted
Terry. Consequently, it assumed that before McFadden frisked
Terry, "no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had
88
occurred."1
The Court's uncertainty seems strained. If, as the Court stated,
a seizure occurs whenever an officer accosts a citizen and restrains
his or her freedom, then Terry and his companions were seized
prior to the frisk. After watching Terry and his friends for ten to
twelve minutes, Officer McFadden decided "the situation was ripe
for direct action." 18 9 He "approached the three men, identified
can tell which are which by physical characteristics and appearance-mostly hair and
dress, but also the look in the eyes. The working principle is that searches of 'kinky'
people for drugs and handguns are necessary and proper, whether or not the searches
would be constitutional if evidence so obtained were presented in court." Id. at 18. See
also Schwartz, supra note 129, at 447.
185 Cf. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 136, at 88 (The constitutional dilemma
confronting judges who must resolve troubling cases is that "neither the fourth amendment, nor anything else in the Constitution, tells judges how secure the people are to
be, or at what cost to law enforcement that level of security is to be obtained.") (footnote
omitted).
186 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
187

188

Id.

Id. at 19 n.16.
kd at 6. A point not often addressed in discussion of Terry is the fact that Terry
and his companions had started to leave the scene prior to Officer McFadden's stopping
them. See William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17
U. MicH.J.L. REP. 551, 588 n.158 (1984) (Terry and Chilton had stopped strolling in
front of the store window and had begun to move "away from the store they were supposedly casing. Thus it seems unlikely that McFadden jumped in to prevent an immi189
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himself as a police officer and asked for their names."' 9 0 When the
men "mumbled something,"' 19 1 the officer spun Terry around and
frisked him for weapons.
Under either of the Court's definitions of "seizure," it seems
clear that Terry was seized before Officer McFadden grabbed him.
Justice Harlan thought so. He explained that the officer's observations justified accosting Terry and "restraining his liberty of movement."' 9 2 Indeed, only the most defiant citizen would feel free to
leave a police officer under such conditions. 9 3 Nevertheless, the
Terry majority assumed that no intrusion had occurred that implicated the fourth amendment.' 9 4 Had the Court directly confronted
the facts, it would have been forced to acknowledge that accosting a
person on the street restrains liberty and demands fourth amendment scrutiny.' 9 5
Although the Terry Court avoided confronting the consenent hold up. It seems more likely that he acted to prevent them from getting away,
after they had given up on (or at least postponed) their plan.") (emphasis in original).
190 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
191 Id. at 7 (internal quotations omitted).
192 Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
193 See H. UVILLER, supra note 172, at 15-16.
194
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
195
As in other areas of constitutional adjudication, the perspective of the decisionmaker often plays a central role in the formulation of fourth amendment principles. See
Martha Minow, Foreward"Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). The manner in
which the Terry Court dealt with the question of whether Officer McFadden's accosting
of Terry constituted a seizure illustrates the importance of perspective. The Court, particularly Chief Justice Warren, was primarily concerned with giving police officers the
power to frisk citizens where they believed the individual might be armed and dangerous. B. SCmvARTZ, supra note 50, at 685-87.
As noted at supra note 50, this concern is legitimate. Yet there was substantial evidence that police officers were using stop and frisk tactics against minorities and the
poor for reasons that had nothing to do with police safety. This fact, of which the Court
was well aware, Terry, 392 U.S. at 14, occupied a subordinate place in the Court's analysis.
Being accosted and questioned by police officers, however, is something that disfavored members of society experience on a daily basis. Professor Amsterdam has noted
that "[u]nless one takes a very middle-class white view of life, [police accosting citizens]
is a practice that cries out for some sort of fourth amendment regulation." Amsterdam,
supra note 154, at 405.
Rather than factor this point into its judicial calculus, Terry was careful to emphasize
"the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily situations in
which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street." Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
While recognizing that many forms of field interrogation violated the fourth amendment, the Court believed it was "powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal." Id. at 13-14; see also
Barrett, supra note 129, at 55 (illegal arrests and detentions designed to harass, physical
abuse of persons in custody, and police destruction of property are not "affected by the
[exclusionary] rule or by the cognate rule excluding coerced or illegaly obtained confessions") (footnote omitted); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 54, § 9.1(e), at 345-48 (essential
point of ChiefJustice Warren's remarks was that illegal street encounters will not be
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quences of the right-to-inquire rule, it was inevitable that the Court
would eventually have to address the validity of official accosting
and questioning of citizens in public. In the drug courier profile
cases, 19 6 the Court accorded police officials broad discretionary
powers that do not implicate the fourth amendment. Mendenhall and
Royer demonstrated that questioning citizens does not trigger fourth
amendment scrutiny. A seizure occurs only where, in light of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, a reasonable person would feel that he or she was not free to
19 7
leave.
On its face, this standard is unobjectionable. The same, however, cannot be said for the Court's application of the standard.
The Court held in Mendenhall and Royer that no seizure occurs when
armed police officers accost a citizen, request' 9 8 identification, and
deterred by the exclusionary rule because such confrontations are often motivated by
objectives other than prosecution and conviction).
Although the exclusionary rule may not be perfect, its alleged flaws provide no excuse for the Court's reluctance to condemn police practices that undoubtedly violate the
Constitution. Furthermore, the fact that some legitimate police practices are "closely
similar," Terry, 392 U.S. at 13, to illegal police encounters does not excuse the Court
from drawing a line, and then enforcing it, so that the police are not the ones who
decide when fourth amendment rights are taken seriously.
196 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
197 As Professor Butterfoss has explained, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Mendenhall actually offers two definitions of when a fourth amendment seizure occurs. See
Butterfoss, supra note 161, at 445. Compare Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 (a seizure occurs
"'only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' ") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16); and id. at
553, with id. at 554 ("We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."). In analyzing the facts, Justice Stewart used the latter definition to decide that Mendenhall had
not been seized. Professor Butterfoss has detailed why this second definition is inadequate for determining whether a person's freedom of movement has been restrained
during a typical street encounter. Butterfoss, supra note 161, at 450 (the latter Mendenhall
standard is underinclusive because it ignores the fact that "most citizens do not feel free
to walk away from a police officer who approaches to ask them questions," and it downplays the fact that in many cases a person's liberty is restrained because an "officer does
not intend to let the citizen continue on their way if they assert their right to do so").
198 In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart made a point of the fact that the officers "requested, but did not demand to see [Mendenhall's] identification and ticket." 446 U.S.
at 555. Apparently, some of the Justices believe that there is a meaningful distinction,
for fourth amendment purposes, between an officer's "requesting" or "asking" for a
person's identification, and an officer's "demand" to see it. Marjorie E. Murphy, Encounters of a Brief Kind: On Arbitrarinessand Police Demandsfor Identification, ARrz. ST. LJ.
207, 217 n.86 (1986).
The so-called difference between a police "request" and "demand" is another example of the "wordsmanship" police departments have become so adept at in describing their investigatory activities. See Yale Kamisar, Book Review, 76 HAuv. L. REV. 1502,
1503 (1963) [hereinafter Kamisar, Book Review]. Citizens and police officers who have
been involved in or witnessed street encounters would probably find a distinction be-
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demand an explanation for his or her presence in a public area.
How can the Court say that a reasonable person would feel free to
leave an armed police officer in these circumstances?
The right-to-inquire rule inevitably led the Court to scorn the
reality of police-citizen encounters. In Mendenhall,19 9 Justice Stewart
first reaffirmed that government officers have the authority to seek
information from all citizens. 20 0 The right-to-inquire supersedes
whatever protection the fourth amendment provides. Justice Stewart then defined the boundaries of a fourth amendment seizure to
ensure that the government's right-to-inquire would remain unhampered. Indeed, he asserted that a diminished right-to-inquire
rule "would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. ' 20 1 This, of course, was
the crux of the matter. Justice Stewart was unwilling to forgo "the
acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective
enforcement of the criminal laws" 20 2 in order to protect fourth
amendment principles. In effect, he carved out an exception to the
fourth amendment for a coercive form of police activity and declared that this activity may be used at the discretion of the police.
In the unrealistic world of Mendenhall, the average citizen feels
free to ignore a police officer who has approached her. In this abstract world, it is irrelevant whether the citizen is aware of her right
tween "requests" and "demands" for identification fanciful. See, e.g., H. UviL.gER, supra
note 172, at 15 ("Almost all the [police officers] I watched on the street displayed an
attitude of toughness and consideration toward the people they approached.... Police
officers relish respect and, in many small ways, insist on a show of deference from the
ordinary folk among whom they work."); Reich, supra note 161, at 1162 ("But it is not
quite the same when the police stop someone. There is authority in the approach of the
police, and command in their tone.").
199 As one commentator has noted, the analysis adopted by justice Stewart in Mendenhall, and later reaffirmed in Royer and Delgado, "is essentially the approach suggested
by [Professor] LaFave" in his treatise on the fourth amendment. Yale Kamisar, Introduction: Trends and Developments with Respect to that Amendment "Central to Enjoyment of Other
Guarantees of the Bill of Rights," 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 409, 410 (1984) [hereinafter
Kasimar, Trends and Developments] (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(g) at 53-55 (1978)). Indeed, this same commentator has referred to this standard as the "LaFave-Stewart approach." See Kamisar,
supra note 60, at 141.
Although Professor LaFave has not criticized the Mendenhall-Royer analysis in his
updated treatise, see 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 54, § 9.2(h), at 401-22, I will refrain from
labeling the Court's standard the "LaFave-Stewart approach" because I am not sure that
Professor LaFave would want his name associated with the Court's more recent decisions in this area. For convenience, I will refer to Justice Stewart's analysis as the "Mendenhall" standard or test.
200
Interestingly, Justice Stewart did not rely upon the majority opinion in Terry, but
instead quoted the concurring opinions ofJustices Harlan and White in support of the
proposition that the police are free to approach and question citizens on the street.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
201
Id. at 554.
202

Id.
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to ignore the officer.2 03 In the real world, however, few people are
aware of their fourth amendment rights, many individuals are fear20 4
ful of the police, and police officers know how to exploit this fear.
If Mendenhall had dealt with the issue candidly, it would have acknowledged that the average person does not feel free to leave a
police encounter.2 0 5 If a person is unlikely to ignore an officer's approach, and is equally unlikely to know of her right to depart, is the
Court really serious in believing that the average person will exercise her right to do so?
Realistically, the Justices probably do not believe that the typical police-citizen encounter is the equivalent of two old friends
greeting each other on the street comer. Professor Kamisar has
given a more plausible explanation for the Mendenhall standard. He
observed that the standard is actually a "policy decision that the police should be allowed to rely on the moral and instinctive pressure
to cooperate inherent in [police-citizen] encounters by not treating
20 6
them as 'seizures' for Fourth Amendment purposes."
Professor LaFave-the person most responsible for formulating
the standard 2 07-also recognizes that the standard is partly a legal
fiction.2 0 8 However, he defends the test. Professor LaFave argues
that the Mendenhall test is appropriate because the police "should be
203
I- Justice Stewart's description of police confrontations as consensual encounters was made possible by his prior legal analysis in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Bustamonte Court held that "[v]oluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a
right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent." Id.
at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
204
See H. UVILLER, supra note 172, at 16.
205
Commentators are generally in agreement that the average person will not feel
free to leave a police official who has approached and addressed questions to him. See,
e.g., 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 54, § 9.2(h), at 410; Robert L. Bogomolny, Street Patrob The
Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 CiuM. L. BuLL.544, 562 (1976); Butterfoss, supra note 161, at
439; Foote, supra note 125, at 407; Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The
Concepts of "Stop"and "Arrest", 43 Onto ST. LJ. 771, 801 (1982); Note, supra note 161, at
611 n.167; Yale Kamisar, Arrest, Search and Seizure (The Prepared Remarks (Part I) of
Yale Kamisar at the U.S. Law Week's Tenth Annual Constitutional Law Conference)
(Sept. 10, 1988) ("Very few people approached or encountered by federal drug agents,
or even local detectives, really 'feel free' to disregard their questions and simply walk
away.") (emphasis in original) (on file with the author).
The Court's contrary view-that a person approached and questioned by law enforcement officials will feel free to disregard the officials, ignore their questions and walk
away, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555; Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98-was not supported by any
empirical evidence. The Court's conclusion was thus another example of a "prescriptive
statement masquerading as a descriptive observation." Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 20,
at 630 n.154.
206 Kamisar, supra note 205, at 16 (emphasis in original).
207 See Kamisar, Trends and Developments, supra note 199, at 410.
208
See W. LAFAVE, supra note 54, at 410-11 ("[I]f the ultimate issue is perceived as
being whether the suspect 'would feel free to walk away,' then virtually all police-citizen
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allowed to 'seek cooperation, even where [their actions] may involve
inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen, and even though
many citizens will defer to this authority of the police because they
believe-in some vague way-that they should.' ",209 A police-citizen encounter constitutes a seizure only if the officer increases the
inherent pressure "by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that
accepted in social intercourse." 2' 1 0 The crucial question is whether
the officer has "conducted himself in a manner which would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two ordinary
21 1
citizens."
Both the Court and Professor LaFave imply that it is sound "social policy" to allow law enforcement officials to stop and question
persons even where there is no suggestion of criminality: Currently,
this policy is probably thought to help the government's efforts in
the "war on drugs." Therefore, the Court will turn a blind eye to
street encounters "by not treating them as 'seizures' for Fourth
Amendment purposes" 2 12 even when these confrontations are perceived as seizures by the citizenry at large.
The fourth amendment deserves better treatment. If it is inappropriate for the Court to impose its views of sound "social policy"
on other provisions of the Constitution, 213 it is equally inapposite
for the Court to use policy argument to shape the fourth amendment. 2 14 It is a truism to say that police questioning is an effective
tool for law enforcement. Many indiscriminate techniques-such as,
dragnet seizures-could also promote certain forms of law enforcement. That fact alone cannot mean that arbitrary techniques are
constitutional.
Nor does it suffice to assert that an innocent person will only
suffer minor inconvenience or embarrassment during a police encounter. The fourth amendment protects individual liberty from arbitrary government prerogative. When the police have no basis for
accosting a person, the citizen should be allowed to decide whether
encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a-Fourth Amendment seizure.") (citations
and footnotes omitted).
209
Id. at 411.
210
Id. at 412.
211
Id.
212
Kamisar, supra note 205, at 16.
213
See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.").
214
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[T]he presence of the word 'unreasonable' in the text of the
Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to
answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good.") (emphasis in original).
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he or she wishes to deal with police officials, and not vice versa.
Why should citizens be subjected to intimidating, inconvenient, or
embarrassing encounters when the police have no good reason to
5
suspect criminality? 21
As Justice Douglas predicted, the inevitable result of a fourth
amendment jurisprudence keyed to balancing or sound social policy
is to "give the police the upper hand. ' 216 The Court should place
the burden on the police by limiting their authority to accost and
question citizens to occasions where there is some particularized
and objective reason for doing so. Instead, the Court puts the burden on the citizen by suggesting that if he is bothered by the encounter, he can "disregard the [officer's] questions and walk
away."' 21 7 This approach is unrealistic and unfair. It is unrealistic
because few, if any, citizens will resist an officer's demands. It is
unfair because it adopts the police officer's perspective, rather than
the citizen's, in judging the constitutional validity of police invasions. After all, the fourth amendment speaks of the rights of the
people, not of the police.
Mendenhall significantly expanded the right-to-inquire rule by
making clear that the government's right to accost individuals in
public is not confined to persons reasonably suspected of criminal
conduct. It is not reassuring to be told that the Court believes that
the fourth amendment prohibits "'arbitrary and oppressive' ",218
government intrusions when one is also told that certain invasions
of liberty are not really intrusions after all, and can therefore be arbitrary and oppressive.
215
Professor LaFave misses the mark when he suggests that the central question is
whether the officer has "conducted himself in a manner which would be perceived as a
nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two ordinary citizens." W. LaFave, supra
note 54, at 412 (footnote omitted). This test is inapt because few, if any, citizens perceive a uniformed and armed police official as just another "ordinary" citizen. Indeed,
the officer is most likely seen for what he or she actually is-an agent of the government.
See Foote, supra note 125, at 403 ("Were a civilian to ask such a question there would
certainly be no restraint, but what on their face are merely words of request take on
color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor."); Reich, supra note 161, at
1162 ("But it is not quite the same when the police stop someone. There is authority in
the approach of the police, and command in their tone. I can ignore the ordinary person, but can I ignore the police?").
Furthermore, it is hard to imagine an ordinary citizen approaching another citizen
on the street and requesting to see some identification, or asking the citizen to account
for her presence in the area. Such exchanges seldom occur between civilians. Thus,
when a police officer initiates such conversation, the average citizen is likely to be taken
aback. And because the officer manifests the authority and power of the state, it is no
surprise that the citizen readily complies with the requests of the officer.
216 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
218 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
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INS v. Delgado dispelled any doubt that the Court would continue to analyze police confrontations disingenuously. In its treatment of both individual police-citizen encounters and massive
workplace investigations, Delgado further limited the concept of
seizure.
Delgado goes beyond Mendenhall by withholding constitutional
scrutiny of police confrontations until the encounter becomes menacing. Now a police encounter does not constitute a seizure until
the situation becomes "so intimidating"2 1 9 that a person might fear
police reprisal. For the ordinary citizen, almost any encounter with
an armed police official is inherently intimidating. Once that encounter reaches the point where an officer requests identification, or
asks the person to account for his presence in an area, informality
has evaporated. 2 20 Fourth amendment protections should not be
suspended until an encounter reaches the point of becoming "so
intimidating" that a person fears there would be police reprisal if he
terminated the encounter. A polite, soft-spoken federal agent who
interferes with a person's liberty should have good cause to do sono less than a gruff, gravel-voiced police officer.
Delgado's response to the respondents' claim that the entire
workforce was seized during the INS raids is also questionable. The
Court gave two reasons why no workforce seizure occurred. First,
"when people are at work their freedom to move about has been
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers." 22 ' Second, the workers had no reason to fear that the agents
2 22
positioned at the exits would prevent them from leaving.
The Court's first point is not helpful. Admittedly, workers can219 Id. at 216. Delgado did not explain how intimidating a police confrontation is
permitted to be before it becomes "so intimidating" that constitutional scrutiny is triggered. Apparently, a slight or minimum level of intimidation is permissible. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1988) (explaining that the "very presence of a
police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating,... [but]
not 'so intimidating' that respondent could reasonably have believed that he was not free
to disregard the police presence and go about his business.") (emphasis added).
The Court must believe there is some magical zone between ordinary police intimidation and police behavior that is "so intimidating" that the average person will not feel

free to leave. This view also apparently assumes that officers who are questioning citizens in airports or on buses, or chasing pedestrians down the street are able to perceive
when their actions have crossed into that magical zone.
220
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 511 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
221

Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.

Any such fear was unfounded because "there [was] nothing in the record indicating that this is what the agents at the doors actually did. The obvious purpose of the
agents' presence at the factory doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were
questioned." Id.
222
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not do as they please while on the job, 223 but this begs the question.
The Court earlier held that an employer does not waive her fourth
amendment right to be free from the "unbridled discretion" of inspection officials merely by giving her employees access to the workplace. 224 Similarly, employees should not be deemed to have
waived their fourth amendment rights merely by choosing to
work.

22 5

Under Delgado's "blame the victim" approach, there would presumably be no seizure if police officers questioned subway passengers on a train that was momentarily stopped at a station while other
officers positioned themselves in front of the train's doors. Using
Justice Rehnquist's analysis, it can be argued that the riders in a subway car are inherently restricted in their movements, not by the actions of the police officers, but by their choice of travel. If the
subway riders had wanted true freedom from restraint, they should
have walked or driven automobiles.
Similarly, relying upon what the agents in Delgado "actually did"
seems misplaced if the Court is truly concerned with whether government officers are conveying a "show of authority" to persons
subjected to their activities. 226 Under Delgado's second premise,
placing officers at the doors of the train would not escalate the encounter into a mass seizure of the subway car as long as the officers
did not physically prevent anyone from leaving. Again, as in Delgado, the purpose of their presence would simply be to assure that
all the riders were questioned, a perfectly legitimate police practice.
Regardless of whether officers actually prevented persons from
Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring):
A man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his home, for example,
even though his wife and children have the run of the place--and indeed,
even though his landlord has the right to conduct unannounced inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one's personal office is constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even
though employer and co-workers are not excluded.
224
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978).
225
See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (The workplace environment for the average employee includes "a small, recognizable community that is a locus of friendships, gossip, common effort, and shared experience.... This experience... forms the basis for a legitimate, albeit modest, expectation
of privacy that cannot be indiscriminately invaded by government agents."). But see
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 717-18. For criticism of Ortega, see Tracey Maclin, ConstructingFourth
Amendment Principlesfrom the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 669, 701-05, 733-35 (1988).
226
Interestingly, like Justice Stewart in Mendenhall, see supra note 197, Justice Rehnquist ignored Terry's protection-oriented definition of seizure. He only quoted Terry's
more restrictive test for determining when a seizure occurs. "'Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.' " Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
223
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leaving the factories in Delgado, or from exiting the train in the
above hypothetical, the message conveyed to both the workers and
riders is plain-they are not free to leave without first answering the
questions of police officials. 22 7 Whether this encounter takes place
when an agent decides to approach the worker, or occurs when the
worker choses to leave the premises, the atmosphere and message
conveyed by the government presence reflect authority and con2 28
trol.
Some might think this criticism excessive. I think not. Rather
than placing the burden on the government to show justification for
its intrusion,2 29 Delgado puts the onus on the citizen to challenge
government authority. The point is not that very few persons will
have the moxie to assert their fourth amendment rights in the face
of police authority, although we know that most will not. It is
whether citizens in a free society should be forced to challenge the
230
police in order to enjoy the right of locomotion.
Michigan v. Chesternut231 is the most recent example of distortion

of the seizure concept by the right-to-inquire rule. The Court unanimously held that Chesternut was not seized when he was chased
down an alley by a police car. Therefore, the fourth amendment did
not apply to the police actions. The Court conceded that the "presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be
227 See, e.g., Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989) (seizure occurs when
sheriff's officers board bus on interstate trip, approach passenger, and ask to inspect his
ticket and identification), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1990) (No. 891717).
228 A glimpse of the environment created by the INS raids was provided in Justice
Brennan's opinion in Delgado. See 466 U.S. at 230-31 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The workers said the surveys were "carried out by surprise by
relatively large numbers of agents, generally from 15 to 25, who moved systematically
through the rows of workers who were seated at their work stations." Id at 230. Once
the agents discovered suspected illegal aliens, the individuals were handcuffed and taken
off to "waiting vans outside the factory." Id. Finally, some agents were stationed at the
door, while others "would show their badges and direct pointed questions at the workers." Id.
229 This is the approach taken by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Delgado.
Id. at 221-24. He maintained that the government's interest in conducting the surprise
raids outweighed the workers' fourth amendment interests. However, Justice Powell
was troubled by the notion that no seizure had occurred during the INS raids. Id. at 221.
Justice Powell believed the better analysis was the approach utilized in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court assumed that
stopping automobiles at permanent checkpoints away from the Mexican border was a
seizure under the fourth amendment. Id. at 556. The suspicionless seizures, however,
were upheld because of the strong government interest in stemming the flow of illegal
aliens into the country. Id. at 556-64.
230
To paraphrase what Professor Amsterdam has stated in another context, the
fourth amendment does not ask what we expect of government officials, it tells us "what
we should demand of government." Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 384.
231 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
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somewhat intimidating. 2' 32 Yet, this conduct was "not 'so intimidating' that [Chesternut] could reasonably have believed that he was
not free to disregard the police presence and go about his
2 33
business."
How can this result be explained? Police curiosity alone should
not justify chasing a person down the street. A unanimous Court
had already established that an intimidating police intrusion cannot
be justified by the desire to ascertain a citizen's identity, or on the
"understandable desire to assert a police presence" 23 4 into ambiguous surroundings. Where no evidence of criminality exists, the
Court has said, "the balance between the public interest and [a citizen's] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor offreedom
2 35
from police interference.
Chesternut reflects the current Court's unwillingness or inability
to empathize with those citizens who are subjected to police scrutiny.2 36 Is the Court credible when it says that "people are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from
their homes onto the public sidewalks,12 3 7 but then holds that the
police are free to chase individuals up and down the streets, provided their actions are not "so intimidating"? Perhaps the result in
Chesternut is due to the fact that none of the Justices has been recently chased down public streets'by a police car. After Chesternut, if
people want to feel secure on the streets, they had better be track
stars. The use of the right-to-inquire rule has undermined the
Court's ability to credibly define when a person has been seized.
The Court has expanded the rule to a point where the government's
desire to chase, stop, and question persons has become more important than the citizen's right to come and go as he pleases. As the
next section of this critique demonstrates, the Court's right-to-inquire rule has fundamentally altered how fourth amendment cases
are resolved.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216).
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
Id, (emphasis added).
There are other recent examples of the justices' inability to empathize with those
subjected to police intrusion. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (insisting that public employees already have the power to protect
their privacy interests from government scrutiny: "The employee may avoid exposing
personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home."); Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 29 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the fourth amendment interests of an unarmed suspect are sufficiently protected against the police use of
deadly force in a nondangerous context: "to avoid the use of deadly force and the consequent risk to his life, the suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt.").
237 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
232
233
234
235
236
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The Right-to-Inquire Rule and the Police Perspective

The final objection to the right-to-inquire rule focuses on the
Court's perspective in deciding fourth amendment cases. The rule
is more concerned with police interests than with the rights of citizens. When it does concern itself with citizens, the Court looks to a
narrow class. In doing so, the Court disregards Justice Harlan's
warning that the level of fourth amendment protection should not
depend on the "expectations and risks that 'wrongdoers' or 'one
contemplating illegal activities' ought to bear. ' 23 8 By focusing on
what an innocent citizen would have thought had he been in the
defendant's shoes, the Court diminishes every citizen's freedom.
The Court's police-oriented, innocent-citizen perspective undermines the right of locomotion embodied in the fourth amendment.
From its inception, the right-to-inquire rule has emphasized the
needs of the government. In Brinegar,Justice Burton stated that the
facts imposed on the government agents "a positive duty to investigate further, in some such manner as they adopted." 23 9 Justice Burton explained that police officials must remain alert to
circumstances that call for "prompt inquiries and investigations" to
promote crime prevention and enforcement of the law. 240 The
trouble is that the term "investigate" is soft. 2 4 1 There are many ways
to investigate someone without interfering with liberty or personal
security. But Justice Burton clearly used the term as a euphemism
for the seizure of Brinegar.
Justice Fortas echoed this theme in Wainwright. Society's interest in apprehending criminals was apparently so great that Wainwright's refusal to cooperate with the police justified his arrest, even
though the police had no other grounds to believe that Wainwright
24 2
was the wanted suspect.
Not only has the Court adopted a police perspective, it apparently believes that police confrontations should not trouble the average law-abiding citizen. 243 If citizens give truthful answers, they
238
239
240
241

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 179 (Burton, J., concurring).
Id.

See Kamisar, Book Review, supra note 198, at 1503. Kasimar noted:
"False imprisonment" and "arrest on suspicion" are dirty words ....but
nicer, cleaner substitutes have done yeoman service: "arrests for investigation," or even better-because "arrest" itself is "a blunt word, implying stigma and dramatizing the instant at which the liberty of the citizen is
totally subjected to the power of the state"-"detention for investigation" or still better-because still softer-simply "questioning" or
"interviewing."
Id. (citations omitted).
242
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
243
See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990) (when
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have no reason to fear a police confrontation. 244 Inquiry about one's
presence in an area, or a request to see identification, pose no threat
because innocent people know that cooperation with the police is
not likely to result in prolonged detention. This perspective of the
Court affords the police considerable leeway to detect criminal activity. Many law-abiding persons do not fear the consequences of
granting the police power to accost citizens only because they cannot imagine themselves in such a situation.
Where the boundaries of our liberty of movement are drawn
with lines that reflect the views of so-called "innocent" persons,
however, the fourth amendment suffers. Many persons who have
never been guilty of any criminal behavior have ambivalent or negative attitudes about the police. 24 5 Similarly, some individuals may
feel their autonomy impinged when the police groundlessly initiate
a street encounter. And still others may simply be annoyed by the
fact that they have been interrupted. There is nothing unreasonable
in any of these views. It is irrelevant whether some innocent person
would not feel overly embarrassed or offended by a police confrontation. The question is whether such a confrontation infringes upon
a citizen's right of locomotion.
The fourth amendment prohibits all arbitrary government intrusions-even intrusions that later reveal that a person is guilty of a

assessing the "subjective intrusion" associated with a sobriety checkpoint, the "'fear
and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking
over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and
surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop").
244 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218-19. Although phrased in different language, this
view is analogous to the position which Professor Barrett urged in the early in 1960s. See
Barrett, supra note 129, at 58 (arguing that at the investigative stage, the police should
be given "reasonably wide powers of investigation" so that innocent persons are not
subject to unnecessary arrest) (footnote omitted).
245 See Sitz, I10 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Citizens "who have foundby reason of prejudice or misfortune-that encounters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any [police
confrontation] designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior.") See Amsterdam, supra
note 154, at 469 n.488 (The resentment felt by many minorities toward certain types of
police practice was well put by a black male: "'When they stop everybody, they say, well,
they haven't seen you around, you know, they want to get to know your name, and all
this. I can see them stopping you one time, but the same police stopping you every
other day, and asking you the same old question.' ") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967)).

Regrettably, this type of police harassment continues in some quarters. See generally

Black HarvardStudents Protest Actions by Police, Boston Globe, Mar. 23, 1989, at 37, col. 1;
Jackson, supra note 176; Orderon Halting Blacks Is Resdnded in Louisana, N.Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1986, at A32, col. 1; Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, § 4, at 32,
col. 1.
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crime. 24 6 The fourth amendment was meant to limit government
authority, even when that authority appears to serve benevolent
purposes.2 4 7 Where the Court's fourth amendment principles are
limited by those who feel that expansive governmental power is necessary in light of some social crisis-like the war on illegal drugsthe provision no longer stands as a bulwark against police power
and discretion. As Professor Amsterdam has told us, the formulation of fourth amendment principles is ultimately a value judgment
about the type of society in which we wish to live. 248 The history of
the amendment suggests generous freedom for the citizen, and not
boundless discretion for the government.
Some might bristle at this critique. They could surely point to
several declarations of the Court claiming commitment to fourth
amendment principles. The Court's rhetoric is fine; the problem is
that the Court does not take its own rhetoric seriously.
For instance, some Justices have stated that citizens on the
street have a constitutional right to walk away from an approaching
officer when the officer has no objective justification for detaining
the citizen.2 4 9 The Court has also disapproved of police actions that
escalate the intensity of police-citizen encounters where the police
lack objective justification for detaining the citizen. 250
If these declarations were serious, the citizenry should also enjoy the right to signal their intentions that they would rather not
246 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As
Justice Brennan noted:
Like most of the Bill of Rights [the fourth amendment] was not designed
to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for everyone; to be
sure, it must be upheld when asserted by criminals, in order that it may
be at all effective, but it "reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or
not."
Id. (citations omitted). But cf. Loewy, supra note 153 (arguing that the fourth amendment should be read to protect the innocent, and that the guilty are merely incidental
beneficiaries of the provision). For a criticism of Loewy, see Maclin, supra note 225, at
705-18.
247
See Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 353 ("The Bill of Rights in general and the
fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti-government documents.").
248 Id. at 403.
249
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (plurality opinion); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White J., concurring).
250
See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion) (citizen may not be detained, even
momentarily, if he refuses to listen to police questions if police lack objective reason for
suspecting criminal activity may be afoot); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (police
approach and questioning of citizen in alley presumably allowed, but subsequent frisk
impermissible); cf. Mertens, supra note 189, at 608 (the Court seems to be saying that
Terry does not permit an intensification of the intrusion when the intensification's obvious purpose is creating enough pressure to convince the individual to consent to be
searched).
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endure a police encounter at all. 25 ' As one commentator has aptly

described the Court's logic: "Implicit in [the right to avoid answering police questions] is the right to avoid being questioned in the
first place. To require a person to wait for a police officer to approach before turning away would suspend the individual's right to
go on his way from the time he became aware of the officer's ap252
proach until some magic moment when the right reappeared."
As Mr. Chesternut learned, however, the Court does not follow
its own logic. The Chesternut Court declared that a police chase
"would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [Chesternut's] freedom
of movement." 258 In chasing Chesternut down the street, the Court
explained, the police did not use their siren or flash their lights, did
not display any weapons, did not command Chesternut to halt, and
did not aggressively operate their vehicle to block or control Ches2 54
ternut's direction or speed of his movements.
The Court's statements about what did not happen hardly sustain
the constitutionality of what did happen. If the fourth amendment
grants a right to stand or travel on the streets, or the right to avoid
the police, then that right should not turn on the fact that the police
were not as intrusive or frightening as they might have been. 2 55
251
See LaFave, supra note 54, at 408 (often a person will "indicate his lack of consent
[to the police confrontation] by ignoring the officer's summoning or by leaving his presence, which will likely prompt a holding that there was no consent and that police efforts
to renew the encounter constitute a seizure").
252
Rachel A. Van Cleave, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There
No End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 203, 216
(1988).
253
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
254
Id
255
Some may believe that Chesternut is explainable on the grounds that flight from
the police is inherently suspicious. Indeed, the police are trained to be suspicious of
those who seek to avoid them. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 54, § 9.3(c), at 448. The courts,
however, have split on whether flight can provide suspicion for investigatory seizures.
See id. § 9.3(c) (citing cases).
In cases like Chesternut, where flight from the police is the only evidence the police
have, such conduct should be considered insufficient to justify forcible intrusions.
Those who disagree should consider the tactics of the Sheriff of Volusia County, Florida.
According to the New York Times, Sheriff Robert Vogel has posted highway signs warning oncoming motorists of drug search roadblocks. If a motorist slows down or makes a
U-turn to avoid the search, the car will be stopped. See Seth Mydans, Powerful Arms of
Drug War Arousing Concernfor Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1989, at Al.
Is it fair to assume automatically that a motorist who desires to avoid what may be
an intrusive, embarrassing, or inconvenient police confrontation is engaged in criminal
conduct? Consider the following:
A motorist with advance notice of the location of a permanent checkpoint
has the opportunity to avoid the search entirely, or at least to prepare for,

and limit, the intrusion on her privacy ....

A driver who discovers an

unexpected checkpoint on a familiar local road will be startled and distressed. She may infer, correctly, that the checkpoint is not simply "busi-
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The Future of the Right-to-Inquire Rule and the Meaning of
"Seizure"

Despite these objections, the Court's commitment to the rightto-inquire rule appears strong. Indeed, the Court's two newest
members seem to have an exceedingly narrow view of the fourth
amendment. Speaking for himself and Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy has asserted that a seizure occurs "when an individual remains
in the control of law enforcement officials because he reasonably believes, on the basis of their conduct toward him, that he is not free
to go." 2 56 Justice Kennedy believes that, regardless of whether particular police conduct conveys to a person an intention to seize, no
fourth amendment interests are at stake "until [the police conduct]
2 57
achieves a restrainingeffect."
Justice Kennedy's "no restraint, no seizure" approach was reiterated, albeit in dicta, in Brower v. Inyo County.25 8 The issue in Brower
was whether the police had seized a motorist by placing an unilluminated 18-wheel tractor-trailer across both lanes of a two-lane
highway on which the defendant was traveling.2 59 The Court unanimously decided that the use of this roadblock to stop Brower's car
was a seizure.
Justice Scalia, however, took the opportunity to outline his
ness as usual," and may likewise infer, again correctly, that the police
have made a discretionary decision to focus their law enforcement efforts
upon her and others who pass the chosen point.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 (1990) (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Perhaps the motorist feels upset or annoyed for reasons that have nothing to do
with drug trafficking. Should this person be seized simply because he wished to avoid
dealing with the inquiries of a curious sheriff's deputy? I think not. Cf Arnold H.
Loewy, ProtectingCitizensfrom Cops and Crooks: An Assesment of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the FourthAmendment Duringthe 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 329, 347 (1984). Professor Loewy also notes:
mhe location of a roadblock is unknown to the traveler in advance.
Therefore, he cannot allocate time for it in his travel plans. Consequently, the roadblock might delay such diverse travelers as an expectant
mother rushing to a hospital, a law professor rushing to his nine o'clock
class, or a lonely man rushing to a date with the woman of his dreams.
Id.
If we can empathize with a motorist who desires to avoid a surprise police roadblock, why do we have trouble identifying with the plight of Mr. Chesternut? If there is
nothing suspicious about turning to avoid a drug roadblock, then there is nothing suspicious about Mr. Chesternut's fleeing the police. Perhaps Chesternut did not want to
deal with the police that day. Maybe he had been hassled by the cops during a prior
encounter. If so, it is understandable why he might wish to avoid them.
256 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
257 Id. (emphasis added).
258
109 S.Ct. 1378 (1989).
259 The motorist, Brower, was killed when the stolen car he was driving crashed into
the unilluminated tractor-trailer roadblock the police had set up. The roadblock was
apparently installed after Brower resisted police efforts to stop the vehicle he was driving. His heirs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
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views on the nature and meaning of a seizure. Justice Scalia maintained that no seizure occurs unless officials undertake intentional
conduct designed to effectuate a seizure, and that conduct physically
2 60
restrainsthe person or effect that is the target of the police activity.
There is no doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment
designed it to protect the citizenry against the willful misuse of governmental power. 261 However, it is a bold leap from this fact to justice Scalia's assertion that the fourth amendment only prohibits
seizures that result in an intentional acquisition of physical control
over a person.
The Scalia-Kennedy view raises troublesome questions about
the permissible scope of police behavior. Do these Justices suggest
that even if the police turn on their sirens, draw their weapons, or
fire a warning shot over a person's head, there is no seizure if a
person continues to flee? Do we really want to give the police this
much discretion? In the real world of high speed police chases,
guns that fire live ammunition, and innocent citizens who are mistakenly identified as criminals, this approach to the fourth amendment is better left unexplored. Fourth amendment protection
should not depend on such slippery and deceptive conclusions
about the presence of official intent, or whether official conduct resulted in acquiring physical control over a suspect.
There are advantages for the police and the Court in the Kennedy-Scalia "no restraint, no seizure" model. This definition of
"seizure" gives even greater scope to the right-to-inquire rule.
Under this approach, police confrontations will not receive constitutional scrutiny until a person is physically seized. The "no restraint,
no seizure" model provides a dear, easy-to-apply test regarding the
permissible scope of street encounters. 26 2 The only casualty in this
See Brower, 109 S. Ct. at 1381.
Justice Scalia noted that the governmental activity associated with both the writs
of assistance and the general warrants which motivated the colonists to adopt the fourth
amendment involved intentional action. Id.
262 The Court favors the reasonable person standard because of its alleged objectivity. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574. Professor LaFave shares this view. It is important that
the relevant standard be understood and administrable by the officer in the field. "Asking [the officer] to determine whether the suspect feels free to leave. ... 'would require a
prescience neither the police nor anyone else possesses.' A given set of circumstances,
for example, might operate quite differently upon a person with 'a guilty mind' as compared to an 'innocent person.'" LaFave, supra note 54, at 407-08 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142.
An objective, rather than subjective, test is preferable because it frees officers from
having to make impossible judgments about the suspect's state of mind. However, the
desire and need for objective, easily understood, and administrable rules should not
blind the Court into formulating constitutional standards that are out of touch with real
world experiences, especially when those standards will be applied to "a sensitive area of
police activity." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
260
261
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overhaul of constitutional doctrine is the fourth amendment. The
Mendenhall standard was bad enough. The gloss provided by Delgado
made the Mendenhall rule even worse. The Kennedy-Scalia "no restraint, no seizure" rule would fasten the final nail in the coffin for
the right of locomotion.
B.

The Common Sense Rule, the Warrant Requirement, and
Unchecked Police Discretion

Like the right-to-inquire rule, the common sense rule leaves police discretion completely unchecked. Traditionally, the Court preferred to use the procedural safeguards of the warrant clauseincluding the probable cause requirement-to review police behavior. The warrant process was encouraged because "[t]he judicial
warrant has a significant role to play in that it provides the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches [and seizures] than the hurried judgment
of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' "263 The common sense rule retreats from these safeguards of the warrant clause.
1. The Threat to the Warrant Requirement
Under the common sense rule, the Court denounces what it
calls rigid or technical rules that restrict officers during investigatory
seizures. The threat to the warrant requirement is evident. In
United States v. Hensley, 2 64 the Court applied the common sense rule
and equated a police seizure authorized by a warrant with a police
seizure supported only by another department's suspicions. Justice
O'Connor claimed that there was no "reason why a police department should be able to act on the basis of a flyer indicating that
another department has a warrant, but should not be able to act on
the basis of a flyer indicating that another department has a reason2 65
able suspicion of involvement with a crime."
Justice O'Connor's assertion is partially correct. Obviously, police departments must be able to respond to requests from another
department. The real issues, however, involve the basis for the original police request, and the authority wielded by the responding
officer.
When the Court in Whiteley v. Warden 26 6 stated that police officers are entitled to act on the basis of a radio bulletin received
263
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
264
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
265
Id. at 231.
266
401 U.S. 560 (1971).
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from another jurisdiction, it was speaking of police assistance in executing an arrest warrant. In Hensley, however, the officers did not rely
upon the fact that a detached magistrate had scrutinized the information justifying the seizure. In fact, when the Covington police
seized Hensley no one knew whether there was even a "substantial
chance" 26 7 that Hensley had commited the alleged robbery.2 68 The
officers knew only that Hensley was wanted by another police de69
partment for questioning.2

Anticipating this criticism, Justice O'Connor contended that
there was no significant difference between reliance on a report that
a warrant had issued, and reliance on a report that another department has reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory seizure.
Relying on Terry's balancing formula, she found no meaningful distinction between these two situations because the police interests
advanced "by allowing one department to make investigatory stops
based upon another department's bulletins or flyers are considera'2 70
ble, while the intrusion on personal security is minimal.

Justice O'Connor's failure to distinguish a seizure authorized by
a warrant from a seizure supported only by another police department's suspicions ignores a fundamental precept of fourth amendment law. The framers envisioned checking zealous police officials

by interposing judicial review between the government and its citizens. 27 1 When government officials are permitted to seize persons

in the absence of exigent circumstances without first convincing a
judge of the need for their actions, the collective security of society
2 72
stands at risk.
267 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). In Gates, the Court explained
that "'only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the
standard of probable cause.'" Id. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969)).
268
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 223-24. The suspicions of the police department that requested that Hensley be held for questioning apparently never ripened into concrete
evidence of criminality. Hensley was not arrested for the crime of aggravated robbery,
the charge contained in the flyer that justified seizing Hensley. Thus, as Professor
Harper has noted, "[plolice officers may glean from Hensley the fact that they can stop
citizens to investigate past crimes and find evidence of other crimes." Harper, supra note
95, at 38 (footnote omitted).
269 The wanted flyer read as follows:
"Wanted for Investigation Only for Aggravated Robbery"
Wanted for Investigation of Aggravated Robbery which occurred at the
Moon Tavern, 631 Vine Street, St. Bernard, Ohio on December 4, 1981
at 6:19 a.m., is one Thomas James Hensley, M/W-1/18/44, CTL No.
21528, PICA-325, SS#295366974, SFF, 190 lbs. Subject LKA as of 127-81 was Drake Motel. If subject is located pick up and hold for St. Bernard Police. Use caution and consider subject armed and dangerous.
United States v. Hensley, 713 F.2d 220, 222 n.1 (1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
270
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232.
271
See Kamisar, supra note 153, at 571-78.
272
Long ago, in words that seem to have lost their meaning for today's Court, Jus-
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Justice O'Connor unsatisfactorily stresses law enforcement
needs. The fourth amendment, however, was designed to restrain
law enforcement practices, especially those predicated on bare suspicion. Nor will it do to suggest that the personal interests involved
are minimal. While the intrusions that most concerned the framers
were unauthorized searches of the home, there is no logical reason
to distinguish between warrantless searches and warrantless
seizures. 2 73 The text of the fourth amendment makes no distinction
between warrantless searches and seizures. 2 74 Indeed, "[h]ostility to
seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment." 27 5 The Court long ago established that permitting government officials to stop persons on mere
suspicion leaves citizens "at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 2 76 Even in the street encounter context, equating a police
seizure based only on another department's suspicion with a seizure
authorized by a warrant, represents a fundamental shift in fourth
amendment analysis that further weakens the right of locomotion.
2.

The Loss of Objective, Reviewable Criteriafor Assessing Police
Behavior

The common sense rule permits the police to act not on evidence that a judge could evaluate, but on their own "professional"
observations and intuition. The Court defers not to policy judgticeJackson captured the essence of the fourth amendment's requirement that searches
and seizures be authorized by a magistrate's disinterested scrutiny:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-

ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnotes omitted).

273
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,428 (1976) (PowellJ., concurring); id.
at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a counter-argument that all warrantless seizures, even those not necessitated by
any exigency, should be permissible, see Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment WarrantRequirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 603, 647-48 (1982) (arguing that there is
no evidence to suggest that the framers of the fourth amendment considered seizures,
apart from the searches that preceded them, to be inherently suspect absent a warrant;
the specificity requirement of the warrant clause is not relevant where only a seizure
occurs; seizures interfere only with possessory interests).
274
See supra note 8.
275
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
276 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
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ments promulgated by law enforcement supervisors, but to the actions and reactions of individual officers in the field. This approach
provides little guidance to police officers, slight protection to citizens, and no objective criteria by which to review police behavior.
The Court's message is obvious: The lower courts need not
formulate concrete standards for investigatory searches and
seizures. The Court has little interest in constitutional checks on
police discretion. The Justices prefer to rely on the common sense
of the officer in the street. For instance, in Sharpe the Court rejected
a bright-line test for judging the permissible length of investigating
seizures, preferring instead to rely on "common sense and ordinary
human experience" 27 7 as its guiding principle. As a constitutional
standard, this is hardly satisfactory.
Sharpe's suggestion that constitutional interests will be served
by asking "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly," 278 provides no safeguard. Most actions taken by police officers during an investigatory seizure are designed to confirm or dispel suspicions; presumably, law enforcement officials do not engage
in superfluous activities. Furthermore, Sharpe ignores the reality
that law enforcement officers are trained to be suspicious. An officer engrossed in a street confrontation is concerned with discovering criminality; fourth amendment values, if considered, are seen
2 79
only as obstacles to the officer's primary concern.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
Id at 686.
Some might say that this criticism of Sharpe is unfounded. What is wrong, one
might ask, with a standard that hinges on whether the means of investigation are likely to
resolve matters soon? Indeed, some might say that Sharpe is simply a logical extension
of the principle initiated in Terry.
Of course, in a technical sense, Sharpe and Terry involved very different issues. Yet,
when viewed from a broader perspective, both illustrate how the Court views street encounters. While Teny certainly had its problems, see supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text, it at least recognized that a police intrusion must "be strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. Sharpe, in contrast,
offers only a malleable test. If the focus is on whether the police have diligently pursued
investigatory methods that will confirm or dispel their suspicions, the seizure can be as
long as the police find necessary.
Moreover, when assessing police behavior, Sharpe merely asks whether the officer's
conduct fits within a vague concept of "common sense and ordinary human experience." 470 U.S. at 685. Sharpe made plain that the Court would not second-guess police incompetence and bungling, even when obvious investigative alternatives were
available and even if the individual seized by the police seizure was entirely "innocent"
of wrongdoing. See id. at 688 n.6. In contrast, Terry required meaningful judicial review.
392 U.S. at 21-22.
Thus, Sharpe seems far afield from Terry. Once the Court sanctioned seizures on less
than probable cause, it was inevitable that it would have to confront the question of the
permissible lengths of such seizures. The methodology used in Sharpe to resolve this
issue was far different from the methodology of Terry.
277
278
279
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Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Hensley is another example of
the Court's deferring to police reaction and intuition. She stated
that when a flyer or bulletin has been issued on a reasonable suspicion, stopping the individual for questioning is permissible even
though an officer is totally ignorant of the facts justifying the
seizure. 28 0 Even if it is sometimes appropriate to check the identity
of a person wanted in another locality, stopping Hensley served no
purpose because the Covington officers already knew who he
was. 28 ' One has to wonder what questions the Covington police
would ask Hensley since they knew only that he was wanted for
questioning. The flyer itself gave no hint as to the type of questions
28 2
that might be posed.
Rather than outline the limits of an investigatory seizure, 28 3 Justice O'Connor endorsed a "brief detention" of Hensley because experienced officers might well assume that an arrest warrant had
been obtained after the issuance of the wanted flyer. 28 4 It was,
therefore, permissible for the officers to detain Hensley to see if
their common sense was correct. This logic puts the cart before the
horse: officers are permitted to act first, and find out later if there
were good reasons to justify their intrusive actions. 28 5 The Hensley
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (citation omitted).
See id. at 223-24 (Covington police officers "were acquainted with Hensley" and
periodically looked for him in places he was known to frequent).
The policy of stopping and questioning "known" criminals has been around quite a
long time; like other forms of street patrol practices, this tactic is usually left to the
discretion of individual officers. See K. DAviS, supra note 184, at 40.
282
For the full text of the bulletin, see supra note 269. Curiously, Justice O'Connor
suggested that a seizure would be proper to "inform [Hensley] that the St. Bernard
police wished to question him." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. Perhaps Justice O'Connor
believed that the seizure was intended for Hensley's benefit. Skepticism, however, suggests that Hensley probably would have preferred that the Covington police had refrained from this "public service" action. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.").
283 Justice O'Connor never precisely defines how long an investigatory stop could
take. See Harper, supra note 95, at 33.
284
See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234.
285 Justice O'Connor's deferential approach certainly conflicts with the jurisprudential model urged by Professor Black when constitutional rights are implicated by police
intrusions. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1969). Professor Black argued that the actions of individual police officers are entitled to "no presumption of constitutionality whatever." Id. at 78. As
Professor Black put it:
If [a police official] did not in good faith consider the federal constitutional problem, his judgment on it is nonexistent. If he did consider it,
his judgment, I think it not too unkind to say, is worthless. When the
accused person appeals to the Court on the federal constitutional
ground, he is appealing to the very first official authorized or competent-or, for that matter, likely-to consider his claims.
Id. at 89.
280
281
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Court demanded no proof that an arrest warrant normally follows
the issuance of a wanted flyer. 28 6 Nor was there any evidence of
written police guidelines regarding the procedure for detaining persons named in "wanted flyers." Instead, the Court relied on the as28
sumptions and reactions of officers in the field.

7

Hensley's reasoning cannot be saved by claims that the challenged police techniques are minimally intrusive. As noted previously, emphasizing the manner in which officers perform permits
manipulation of fourth amendment interests. 2s8 For the average officer, "common sense and ordinary human experience" 28 9 might
dictate requiring someone like Hensley to wait in his car for approximately an hour while the officer checks to see if an arrest warrant
has been issued. Such a seizure would therefore not be considered
unduly intrusive in light of the law enforcement interests advanced.
For the individual detained, however, such a seizure is likely quite
2 90
offensive.
286 The government proffered no objective, empirical evidence showing that arrest
warrants usually follow the issuance of flyers. At the trial, the arresting officers simply
stated that in their experience warrants usually follow flyers. Record,Joint Appendix at
22, 33, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (No. 83-1330). This was the only
evidence proffered to prove that warrants usually follow flyers. Brief for the Petitioner
at 3, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (No. 83-1330).
287
Later in her opinion, Justice O'Connor concedes that the flyer did more than ask
other departments to "briefly detain" Hensley. It requested other departments to "pick
up and hold" Hensley. Recognizing that such an action would amount to a defacto arrest
without probable cause, she tries to sidestep the logic of her earlier rhetoric by disclaiming any notion that the Court approves of "actions that could foreseeably violate the
fourth amendment." Hens/ey, 469 U.S. at 235.
This type of waffling will not do. The Court should always be careful about the
scope of authority its holdings grant to police officials because, as Justice Jackson
warned, "the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we
sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
288 See supra notes 198-237 and accompanying text; Maclin, supra note 225, at 687-

92.

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 n.2 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It makes little difference to a traveller [who] . . . is seized whether the police
conscientiously followed a lead or bungled the investigation. The duration and intrusiveness of the seizure is not altered by the diligence the police exercise.").
The extreme deference given to police reaction by Hensey is shown in the Court's
approval of a menacing police tactic in the absence of any sign of danger to police officers or others nearby. Justice O'Connor saw nothing improper when a Covington police officer approached Hensley's vehicle with his gun drawn and pointed in the air.
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235.
Only a few persons would forbid an officer to search a citizen where the officer is
"justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others" nearby. Terry,
392 U.S. at 24. This rule, however, requires that the officer have an immediate, specific,
and articulable basis for the search. The same principle should apply to protective
seizures.
Hensley ignored this rule. When Hensley was seized, there was no evidence that he
289
290
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Police Intrusions and Innocent Behavior

The lack of objective criteria dramatically affects police dealings
with society's disfavored classes. 2 9 ' In the 1960s, some claimed that
allowing detention and questioning of "suspicious" individuals
would encourage arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement
practices. 2 92 The Court maintained in Terry and its progeny that investigative detentions would not be allowed to turn on the subjective views of police officers; instead, officers were required to
articulate specific facts that justified their belief that criminality was
3
afoot. 29
Although the Terry Court promised not to rely on subjective
294
judgments of law enforcement officers, United States v. Sokolow
shows that this promise has not been kept. Sokolow permits government agents to seize individuals based on an unproven belief that
certain innocent behavior is indicative of guilt.
Earlier in the case's history, the Ninth Circuit had held that exhibition of characteristics allegedly shared by drug couriers did not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminality. 29 5 The Supreme
was armed and presently dangerous to the approaching officer. Hensley had been driving his Cadillac convertible down the streets of Covington, Kentucky in a lawful manner;
he posed a threat to no one. Nor was it evident why, if the officer sought to "maintain
the status quo during the course of the stop," Hensley, 469 U.S. at 239, it was necessary
to approach with a drawn weapon. Under ordinary conditions, menacing police tactics
do not maintain the status quo; they intensify and exacerbate the tensions inherent in
police-citizen encounters. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's lax analysis performs "a disservice to society at large." See Harper, supra note 95, at 38 ("Aggressive police action of
pulling citizens over in vehicles ordering them out of their cars, and holding them at
gunpoint, will no doubt have a negative impact in minority communities."). The Court
should require more than police intuition before it sanctions such dangerous police
tactics.
291
See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 184, at 18. See generally Sheri LynnJohnson, Race and
the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE LJ.214 (1983); Schwartz, supra note 129, at 44647.
292
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 129, at 445.
293
See Burkoff, supra note 139, at 690; see also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 54, § 9.3(a), at
422-28.
294
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
295
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418-1419 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 1581 (1989). The Ninth Circuit's fear that drug agents were questioning and seizing
persons "based upon stereotypes of drug courier appearance and behavior," has been
supported by Professor Cloud's extensive empirical study of the drug courier profile.
Professor Cloud's study reveals that "most of the drug courier profile characteristics
appearing in the caselaw do not accurately describe the behaviors of actual drug couriers
and generally are not relied upon by the police." Cloud, supra note 117, at 884.
An example of the type of police conduct that motivated the concerns of the Ninth
Circuit recently surfaced in Georgia. See Edwin W. Lempinen, The Guilty Look, STUDENT
LAWYER, Dec. 1988, at 5 (court documents reveal that a highway drug courier profile was
developed that instructed Georgia state troopers to look for the following: "[M]inorities
who wear 'lots of gold,' cars carrying a box of tissues, which signals cocaine use, and cars
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Court disagreed. 29 6
In finding a reasonable suspicion of criminality, Chief Justice
Rehnquist characterized Sokolow's activities as "out of the ordinary," "more out of the ordinary," and "sufficient to warrant consideration. ' 29 7 Such terms cannot provide a guide for lower courts
that must assess claims of arbitrary police behavior. These criteria
give officers freedom to effect seizures based on personal appearances or habits that lack any connection to ongoing criminal conduct, and most importantly, are neither crime- nor suspect298
specific.
The ChiefJustice implied that relying on the common sense of
drug agents was consistent with the Constitution. Quoting from Illinois v. Gates,29 9 he explained that " 'innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,' and that
'[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry
is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the
degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal
acts.' "300

One can question whether Gates's totality of the circumstances
approach provides any more of a principled way to review police
conduct than does the common sense standard.3 0 ' As Professor
Kamisar has noted, Gates's totality of the circumstances test certainly
does not "limit what [types of innocent] circumstances are to be
considered relevant"3 0 2 for deciding the existence of probable
cause. The totality of the circumstances test will not help judges
review police intrusions because "[a]lmost everything [will be] relecarrying empty McDonald's cartons or pillows and blankets in the back seat, which may
signal drug runners in a hurry.").
296 The Court's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's opinion was not substantive. The
Court basically criticized the lower court for attempting to place a framework on the
reasonable suspicion requirements. Many, however, have complained that the reasonable suspicion analysis sorely needs a framework to guide the police and courts. See, e.g.,
Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile, 65 N.C.L. REv. 417, 438-44, 474-80 (1987);
Cloud, supra note 117, at 870; Grano, supra note 129, at 455; Kamisar, supra note 60, at
132-43.
297 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1582.
298
See Cloud, supra note 117, at 853 (law enforcement officers relying on the drug
courier profile generally do not have "advance information suggesting that a specific
crime has been committed nor even that any passenger on a particular flight is carrying
drugs. Instead, they operate on the assumption that illegal drugs are carried by some
members of the general population of air travellers.").
299 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
300 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-44 n.13).
301
As I argue at infra notes 341-50 and accompanying text, Gates's totality of the
circumstances test and the common sense rule the Court uses in its Terry cases are one
and the same.
302
Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv.
551, 570 (1984).
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vant, but almost nothing [will be] decisive." 30 3 Ultimately, both
Gates and the common sense standard accommodate the interests of
the police to a much greater extent than they accommodate fourth
3 04
amendment interests.
Moreover, although Sokolow correctly recalled that Gates permits
arrest based on innocent facts, this assertion tells only half of the
Gates story. The Chief Justice neglected to add that the facts supporting probable cause in Gates were not ordinary, everyday innocent facts. The "innocent" facts involved in Gates were suspectspecific, 3 0 5 specified the particular crime, described where, when,
and how the alleged crime would occur,3 06 were corroborated by
extensive police surveillance before the police acted to secure a warrant,3 0 7 and suggested a definite "nexus between the corroborated
details and the alleged crime."3 08 Although the facts corroborated
in Gates were innocent in a technical sense, viewed together they
could be called "innocent-plus." The facts in Sokolow were a world
apart from the facts of Gates. Apart from his personal appearance
and habits, nothing suggested that Sokolow and his companion were
engaged in criminal conduct.
Sokolow marked a shift in constitutional law. Allowing seizures
based solely on personal appearances and habits raises concerns
similar to those that influenced the Court a generation ago when it
303

Id.

Id. at 570-71.
An anonymous letter informed the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department
that "a couple in your town... strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue
and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 225.
306
The tip stated: "Most of their [drug] buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance
flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3
she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it
back." Id.
307 After receiving the anonymous tip, the Bloomingdale police corroborated that
Lance Gates did reside in Bloomingdale. They also discovered that an "L. Gates" had
made a reservation to fly to Florida on May 5. The police also learned that Gates did
indeed fly to Florida on May 5, that after arriving in Florida Gates immediately went to a
room in a Holiday Inn registered to Sue Gates, that Gates and an unidentified women
left the motel the next morning in a car bearing Illinois license plates registered in
Gates's name, and that the couple drove northbound on a highway often used by Chicago-bound travelers. After corroborating all of these facts, the Bloomingdale police
then sought and obtained a warrant to search the Gates's home and car. Id. at 266.
Thus, the anonymous tip certainly satisfied justice White's requirement that the informant's information not only appear credible, but also that it appear to be based on "reliable, inside information." Id. at 270 (White, J., concurring).
308
Kamisar, supra note 302, at 568; cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36 (1963)
(while the corroborative actions of the defendant were innocent facts, when considered
with both the informant's tip and the police surveillance that connected Ker with specific
illegal activities involving the same individual, a known drug dealer, there was sufficient
reason to believe Ker was in possession of drugs).
304
305
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struck down overly broad vagrancy laws. In both situations, "there
are no standards governing the exercise of discretion" 30 9 of law enforcement officials. Traditionally, investigative seizures had to be
supported by objective and reviewable criteria, not by hunches or
conclusory factors. Citizens should not to be subjected to police
seizures on the basis of their personal characteristics, habits, or appearance. Appearing "out of the ordinary" or "out of place" with
respect to the general population of a particular neighborhood or
region is not enough to justify being seized.
It would not be radical to require the government to show an
objective or empirical basis for its judgment that apparently innocent conduct justifies a suspicion of criminality. 3 10 The Court in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce3 l declared that roving border patrol
stops were permissible if there was reasonable suspicion that a vehicle was transporting illegal aliens. The Court noted that agents
were free to consider a variety of factors in deciding whether they
had sufficient grounds to justify a stop.3 12 Agents could rely upon
the presence of seemingly innocent factors that were nevertheless
relevant because the government's empirical data exposed the true
nature of the "innocent" conduct. Officers were permitted to rely
upon the area's general characteristics, including its proximity to
the border, the usual pattern of traffic, and collected data regarding
"recent illegal border crossings. '3 13 Significantly, however, the
Court did not endorse the government's claim that its "officers can
recognize the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mex3 14
ico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut."
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), hinted that empirical data could be
an element in demonstrating why facially innocent behavior could support an inference
of criminality. It explained that an assessment of reasonable suspicion under the "totality of the circumstances" could include judicial consideration of not only "objective observations" of officers in the field, but also "information from police reports," if
available, and evaluation of the "modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers." Id. at 418.
311
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
312 A border agent's relevant personal observations included noting that a vehicle
was heavily loaded, contained many passengers, held persons trying to hide, or engaged
in obvious efforts to evade officers. Id at 885.
313
Id. at 884-85; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279, 283
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
314 Brig-noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86. Mexican appearance could not justify seizing
a person because "[l]arge numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a
relatively small portion of them are aliens." Id. at 886; see also Develoments-Race and the
CriminalProcess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1504 (1988) [hereinafter Deveopments] (courts
generally have rejected the use of ethnicity as a blanket criterion to justify investigative
seizures) (footnote omitted). But cf.United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
562-63 (1976) (Border agents may stop vehicles at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning even in the absence of individualized suspicion that vehicle contains illegal aliens.
309
310
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The fundamental point is that police officials should not be free
to effect seizures based upon factors allegedly possessed by those
engaged in criminal conduct, but also shared by a significant percentage of innocent persons particularly when those factors concern
characteristics like race and age. Seizures based upon stereotypes of
appearance and personal habits are not seizures against known or
suspected criminals. 31 5 Instead, they are employed because of a
"statistical chance of uncovering a certain percentage of violators in
large groups of persons." 3 16 Moreover, despite the allure of government statistics, judges are often unable to appraise the basis for a
particular seizure. 31 7 When officials know that their decisions are
essentially unreviewable, the risk of arbitrary and capricious actions
3 18
can become intolerable.
Moreover, it is permissible "to refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspection
area at the... checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol
stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of
apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation.") (footnote
omitted).
315
See Johnson, supra note 291, at 225-41. See generally Stormer & Berstein, supra
note 181; Developments, supra note 314, at 1500-04 (discussing cases where the courts
have allowed law enforcement officers to use race as a factor in justifying investigatory
seizures).
316 Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 20, at 662. This point was originally made by
Professors Jacobs and Strossen regarding the unconstitutionality of suspicionless roadblocks for drunk drivers. They perceptively noted that judicial acceptance of police
seizures based on the statistical likelihood of catching offenders "could be extended to
other pressing law enforcement problems, such as possession of narcotics or firearms, mugging, shoplifting, or bank robberies." Id. (emphasis added).
317
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), exemplifies how government
statistics can influence the Court. Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by the
ChiefJustice and Justice Blackmun, argued that Mendenhall's actions gave the agents a
reasonable suspicion that she was a drug courier. Justice Powell emphasized the specialized training and expertise of federal drug agents in detecting narcotics trafficking. To
bolster this point, Justice Powell noted that "[d]uring the first 18 months of [a drug
courier intercept] program, agents watching the Detroit Airport searched 141 persons in
96 encounters. They found controlled substances in 77 of the encounters and arrested
122 persons." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562.
Although the statistics Justice Powell cites seem convincing at first glance, Professor
Kamisar has noted that the government's high "batting average" may not be so impressive upon closer scrutiny. See Kamisar, supra note 60, at 139. According to Professor
Kamisar:
The government's brief [in Mendenhall] defined "encounters" for purposes of these statistics as encounters where a search ensues. But there may
be many encounters which never progress to the "search" stage, because
the suspect provides satisfactory identification or otherwise dispels suspicion when initially approached or stopped. For all we know there may be
ten or fifteen "encounters" which never escalate to the "search phase"
for every one that does. The DEA agents may have a remarkable record
when they finally order (or "request") the suspect to remove his or her
clothing. But they may have a much less impressive record when all encounters are taken into account.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
318
Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 435 ("The dangers of abuse of a particular
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It is not enough to assert without proof-as the government did
in Sokolow-that innocent persons seldom exhibit the combination
of characteristics that make up a criminal profile. 19 Nor is it persuasive to claim that it is impractical to require agents to support their
seizures with statistical proof.320 The judiciary should not blindly

accept the government's claims, which come at the expense of con32 1
stitutional values.
Merely claiming that an agent has exercised his common sense
in seizing a traveler is not much different from saying that an agent
was acting in "good faith" when he seized a person. 32 2 History,
power are, certainly, a pertinent consideration in determining whether the power should
be allowed in the first instance.").
319
See, e.g., Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1423 ("The government assures us that '[t]he combination of facts in this case will rarely, if ever, describe an innocent traveler.' The obvious lack of substantiation for this claim betrays its lack of merit.").
320 See Brief for the United States at 33-34, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581
(1989) (No. 87-1295). The United States argued:
[Ihe kinds of factors that are important to experienced agents in deciding whether to stop a person traveling through an airport are not readily
susceptible to empirical or statistical proof.... By ordering experienced
narcotics agents to justify their investigative decisions with statistical
proof, the court of appeals has essentially rejected the use of inferences
based on common sense and the shared experience of agents in the field.
Id
Professor Cloud's empirical study indicates that "most of the drug courier profile
characteristics appearing in the caselaw do not accurately describe the behaviors of actual drug couriers and generally are not relied upon by the police." Cloud, supra note
117, at 884; cf. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 20, at 673 (arguing police officials should
maintain records of the facts and circumstances that allegedly justified the necessity of
specific drunk driving roadblocks; such a requirement would "facilitate agency and judicial enforcement of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause standards") (footnote
omitted).
321
Cf. Johnson, supra note 291, at 240. Johnson asserted:
Agents who look for Hispanic drug couriers find them, and agents who lie
in wait for black females do not arrest white males. Of course, these are
not insuperable barriers. If the data are as compelling as the DEA would
like the courts to believe, the ethnic element in drug courier profiles may
satisfy probabilistic constraints. But unless and until the government
provides such data, courts should ignore race when assessing the justification for the detention of a suspected drug courier.
Id.
A recent example of ProfessorJohnson's concerns about the use of race and ethnicity by police officials surfaced in New York City. See People v. Evans, 556 N.Y.S.2d 794
(Apr. 20, 1990). Justice Carol Berkman of the State Supreme Court suppressed evidence found by police officers who had seized and searched a woman because she exhibited "unusual" behavior for someone in the Port Authority bus station, a large bus
terminal in midtown Manhattan. Justice Berkman noted, as an anecdotal matter that all
of the persons arraigned in her court by the Port Authority police were members of
minority groups. Justice Berkman explained that she handled the arraignment of "approximately one-third of the felony cases in New York County and h[ad] no recollection
of any defendant in a [Port Authority Police Department] drug interdiction case who was
not either Black or Hispanic." Id. at 796 n.2.
322
It is no reassurance to be told, as a spokesperson for the Drug Enforcement
Administration was quoted as saying, that government agents "'can spot a drug dealer

1326

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1258

however, teaches that where an officer's subjective good faith is the
test, the fourth amendment means very little, and citizens are " 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police.' ' 32 3 Simply deciding that the police acted
the way a woman can spot a deal at the supermarket.'" Lisa Belkin, AirportAnti-Drug Nets
Snare Many People FittingProfiles, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1990, at B6. If the federal government were as sucessful as it claims, one might expect it to provide data to support its
assertions. It comes as no surprise, however, that the government does not keep statistics on how many people are seized because they fit drug profiles. And, of course, the
government keeps no statistics on how many (or how few) of these seizures result in the
discovery of drugs. Id. See generally Kamisar, supra note 60, at 139; supra note 317 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, government officials do not ease concerns about discriminatory seizures
when they claim that race has nothing to do with who is seized, but operate in a manner
that demonstrates that race has much to do with who is seized. See, e.g., Belkin, supra
(reported in Houston that 86% of those subjected to X-ray searches are Nigerian; of the
60 persons subjected to X-ray searches, only 4 were discovered to be carrying drugs);
Roland Sullivan, Police Say Drug-ProgramProfiles Are Not Biased,N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1990,
at B3 (Port Authority reports that "[a]ll but 2 of the 210 people arrested" under its
drug-interdiction program in 1989 were either black or Hispanic).
323 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). The Court's ruling in Alabama v. White,
110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), will expand the discretion afforded'police to make Terry seizures.
White held that an anonymous tip could justify an investigatory seizure, provided the
police corroborate some aspects of the tip.
In White, police received an anonymous phone call that Vanessa White would be
leaving a specified apartment at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon,
with a broken right taillight lens, going to Dobey's Motel and that she would have cocaine inside a brown attache case.
Officers immediately proceeded to the apartment building. The officers observed
the brown Plymouth with a broken right taillight in front of the specified building.
Shortly, a woman, carrying nothing in her hands, left the building and got in the Plymouth. The vehicle took the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. Before reaching the
Motel, police stopped the car. After receiving White's consent, the police searched an
attache bag discovered in the car. Narcotics were found.
Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice White disagreed with the finding below
that the police had insufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip to furnish reasonable
suspicion that White was engaged in criminal conduct. While conceding that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are relevant in deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, Justice White explained that reasonable suspicion "can arise
from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Id. at
2416 (emphasis added).
It was sufficient that the police corroborated that a woman left the specified building, got into a brown Plymouth, and drove in the direction to the specified destination.
The fact that the police did not know Vanessa White or even know it was Vanessa White
who left the building was immaterial. Nor did it matter that the police failed to corroborate the particular time White was supposed to leave the building. Under a totality of
the circumstances test, once the police verify "significant aspects" of a tip, there is "reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at
least well enough to justify the stop." Id. at 2417.
It is not troublesome that White sanctioned the use of anonymous tips to justify
investigatory seizures. If such tips are permitted to establish probable cause, see Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, reh'gdenied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983), there is no apparent reason
why they cannot be used to show reasonable suspicion. What is disturbing about White
is the reaffirmation that under the Court's "balancing" test, criteria that enhance police
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3 24
reasonably cannot be enough.

IV
SOURCES OF THE DECLINE OF THE RIGHTr OF LOCOMOTION
The preceding analysis describes the current state of the right
of locomotion and demonstrates the doctrinal weaknesses in the
Court's elimination of it. The cost to individual freedom is obvious.
It is perhaps less obvious that the Court has overlooked two important matters. First, the Court mischaracterizes the constitutional interests at stake in the public travel cases. Rather than focusing on
whether any privacy interest has been deprived by police officials,
the Court should recognize that nonprivacy interests are also implicated in a street encounter. Persons on the street and in other pubsuspicions are emphasized, while factors that promote fourth amendment values are ignored.
For example, in deciding whether police are free to seize persons based upon partially corroborated anonymous tips, should not the urgency surrounding the investigation be a relevant factor in judging the reasonableness of the police intrusion? Cf.
Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958, 959 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (Prior precedents have "emphasized the specificity of the information provided, the independent corroboration by the police officer, and the danger to the public.") In a case involving an alleged emergency, more deference can be given to intrusive
police reactions. Where there is no apparent emergency, it is ironic to let the police rely
upon "information... less reliable" than required in other fourth amendment contexts.
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.
Also, where the police act on information that is, by definition, unknown and presumably unreliable, what is unreasonable about asking police officers to consider alternative means of investigation before effectuating a forcible seizure? Would it have been
unreasonable for the police to ascertain that the woman who drove the Plymouth was
Vanessa White? A radio check of the vehicle's license plate might have revealed her
physical description. If this were unavailable, officers could have approached her on the
street after she exited her vehicle and requested to see some identification. Still simpler,
the officer receiving the tip could have asked the anonymous informant to provide a
description of White. Under the Court's holding, however, the police were not required
to even consider the feasibility of these investigative methods.
Finally, and perhaps most distressing, was the Court's failure to even acknowledge
the potential for abuse associated with anonymous tips. As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in White, "every citizen is [now] subject to being seized and questioned by any
officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on an anonymous
tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." White, 110 S. Ct. at 2418.
For an example of the type of abuse that can occur when police officers feel free to
fabricate "anonymous informants," see Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 542
N.E.2d 275 (1989).
324 When the Court formulates a fourth amendment theory that makes the common
sense of the officer the constitutional yardstick, the consequences of this approach in the
real world are predictable:
What it means in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts and
trial courts defer to the police. What other results should we expect? If
there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may
not do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did was
unreasonable.
Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 394.
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lic places have rights of locomotion and personal integrity,
independent of any privacy right.
Second, the reasonable suspicion standard also gravely limits
the right of locomotion. Rather than operating as a guard against
arbitrary and capricious police intrusions, the reasonable suspicion
standard permits the Court to defer to police intuition and subjectivity. This, of course, was not the Court's intent when it first
adopted an intermediate standard for reviewing police intrusions.
Terry sanctioned police invasions on less than probable cause only
when an officer possessed "specific and articulable facts" whichjustified the intrusion.3 25 Terry also envisioned vigorous judicial review.3 2 6 The development of the probable cause standard since
Terry, however, leaves little legitimate reason for continued use of
the reasonable suspicion standard.
A. The Mistaken Emphasis on Privacy Interests
Ironically, it was not long ago that a unanimous Court recognized the constitutional vice in the rule it now promotes. Brown v.
TexaS3 2 7 marked a zenith in the fourth amendment's protection of
the person on the street. There, police officers observed Brown and
a companion walking away from each other in an alley located in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users. The officers accosted
Brown and demanded to see identification; Brown refused to comply, and was subsequently arrested for refusing to identify himself.
A unanimous Court held that this action violated the fourth
32 9
amendment. 3 28 The fact that the situation "looked suspicious,"
and the area was frequented by drug users, was not enough to justify stopping Brown. Moreover, while it may have been "underTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
Id. at 22-23.
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Id at 51-53. Some commentators have questioned the Court's description of
when the seizure actually occurred in Brown. The Court expressly stated that "[w]hen
the officers detained [Brown] for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they
performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Id at 50. Shortly after this statement, the Court repeated Terry's broad definition of "seizure" by noting that "'whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person.'" Id (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 16).
A sensible reading of Brown supports the view that the seizure occurred as soon as
the officers approached Brown, asked him for identification and an explanation of his
presence, and Brown angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop him. Would
the average person believe that Brown was free to leave at this point?
Professors LaFave and Williamson, however, have cautioned against broad readings
of Brown. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 54, § 9.2(h), at 403 n.203; Williamson, supra note
205, at 785.
329 Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.
325
326
327
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standable" from an officer's perspective to inject a "police
presence"330 into the situation, that desire was constitutionally inadequate to justify a fourth amendment deprivation. Separately or in
combination, these government concerns were insufficient to justify
accosting or detaining Brown.
Brown v. Texas was reminiscent of an earlier judicial era. It recognized that rights of personal security and locomotion are not
waived because one appears suspicious. 3 3 ' Brown made clear that
"the balance between the public interest [in law enforcement] and
[one's] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor offteedom
3 32
from police interference."
The Court is no longer faithful to the view envisioned in Brown.
Chesternut epitomizes the Court's new outlook. Chesternut not only
affirmed that pedestrians have no expectation of privacy against police inquiries, it ruled that pedestrians have no right of privacy
against a "police presence" that includes being chased by a police
cruiser. Justice Blackmun relied upon United States v. Knotts3 3 3 and
Florida v. Royer 3 34 to support this conclusion. Both of these cases
also made clear that persons in public places have little, if any, privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment.
Knotts held that governmental monitoring of a vehicle traveling
on the open road with a beeper-laden container does not violate any
protected expectation of privacy.3 35 In fact, Knotts resolutely stated
that a "person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
330
Id at 52. The Chief Justice's statement about the "understandable" desire to
assert a police presence should not go unquestioned. A desire to assert a police presence in a situation similar to Brown is understandable-and constitutionally unobjectionable-so long as one carefully defines "police presence."
If a "police presence" means sending a police cruiser down a street to observe a
suspicious looking character, fourth amendment values suffer no harm. On the other
hand, if a police presence means the type of police harassment described by Professor
Reich, see Reich, supra note 198, at 1161-62 (person walking at night stopped on the
street by an officer demanding that the person reveal his identification, age, occupation,
and reason for being out on the street), or the police conduct involved in Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (black male who liked to walk late at night in the white
neighborhoods of suburban San Diego was stopped or arrested 15 times), then one can
question the desirability-and constitutional validity-of injecting a police presence into
so-called suspicious situations.
331
As Justice Brennan has noted, the decision in Brown also made clear "that a State
may not make it a crime to refuse to provide identification on demand in the absence of
reasonable suspicion." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 368 (1983) (Brennan, J.,

concurring).
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. The reasoning of Knotts is criticized in Wayne R. LaFave,
The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,28 ARiz. L. REv.
332
333
334
335

291, 303-04 (1986).
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place to another."3 3 6 If a motorist has no expectation of privacy regarding the movement of his car on the street, it follows a fortiori
that a pedestrian has no expectation of privacy with respect to his
33 7
movements on the street.

Royer explained that no fourth amendment interests are jeopardized when a police officer accosts and questions an individual in a
public place. A police officer, like anyone else, has a right to address
questions to other persons,3 3 8 and there are diminished expectations of privacy in public places.3 3 9 Consequently, persons who
"voluntarily" choose to travel on the streets, as in Knotts, or move
about in a public place, as in Royer, cannot expect to be free from a
police presence that is not too intimidating. Therefore, Chesternut
was in no more of a position to assert a fourth amendment interest
than were the defendants in Knotts and Royer.
It is not clear why the Court refuses to distinguish between a
pedestrian's lack of privacy while in a public place, and a person's
rights of personal security and locomotion. Perhaps the modern
constitutional fascination with the right of privacy obscures other
fourth amendment values. Perhaps this distinction is rejected because recognition of a meaningful right of locomotion would cripple
the right-to-inquire rule, or reveal the shallowness of the common
sense standard. Whatever the motivation, the principle expressed
in Brown v. Texas has been discarded. Despite the fourth amendment's express command to secure citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures in their "persons" as well as in their
"houses," 3 40 the Court has left no doubt that the average citizen is
not free to come and go as he pleases.
B.

The Reasonable Suspicion Test as the Probable Cause
Standard

Given the development of the probable cause standard, the
reasonable suspicion test is no longer needed. At the time Terry was
decided, there was a theoretical need for an intermediate stanKnotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
In Mendenhall, two Justices made clear their view that a person enjoys more protection from police intrusion while traveling in his automobile than when walking on the
street. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556-57 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); cf. Murphy, supra note 198, at 215 n.59 (noting the apparent inconsistency
between the Court's analysis of police-pedestrianencounters andpolice-motoristencounters).
338
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
339
Cf. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam) (the defendant "'was
approached in a major international airport where, due in part to extensive antihijacking
surveillance and equipment, reasonable privacy expectations are of significantly lesser
magnitude.'" (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
340
See supra note 8.
336
337
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dard.3 4 1 The probable cause standard then had some real "teeth"
to it.342 Since Gates,343 however, the meaning of probable cause has
changed. Gates explicitly stated that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules."3 44 According to Gates, probable cause only requires a
There is nothing endemically wrong with the idea of stop and frisk. Indeed, the mission of stop and frisk theory to establish some third state of
police powers, midway between those that can be exercised wholly arbitrarily (such as the power of non-coercive, non-detentive street questioning) and those available only upon probable cause (such as arrest and
search), has the allure of sweet reasonableness and compromise.
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 126, at 56.
342
See e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968) (no reason to believe that a
person who was in the company of narcotics addicts for over an eight-hour period was
engaged in criminal behavior;, such an inference "is simply not the sort of reasonable
inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal
security."); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (officer testified that he had been informed
that the defendant, who had a previous criminal record, would be engaged in numbers
running at a certain place and time; no probable cause for arrest where the officer observed the defendant in the predicted place); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 10304 (1959) (no probable cause for arrest despite federal agents' knowledge that a crime
of interstate theft had been recently committed in the vicinity; a companion of the defendant had been implicated in some interstate shipments; and the defendant and companion were observed in the same vicinity picking up and loading cartons in a car and
then driving away).
Professor Sundby might disagree with the notion that probable cause was a rigorous
standard when Terry was decided. He traces the demise of the traditional probable cause
standard to Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). He then argues that
Camara's redefinition of "probable cause to include government justification independent of suspicious activity not only conceptually diminished the role of traditional probable cause ...but also diluted its meaning in a way that created a new receptiveness to
government intrusions." Camara permitted the government to demonstrate probable
cause on the basis of innocent conduct. Because of this shift, "the fourth amendment no
longer revolved around a concept that unambiguously emphasized both nonintrusion by
the government and an individual's right to privacy." Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv.383, 40001 (1988).
343 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
344
Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Of course, this aspect of Gates did not go unnoticed. Professor Wasserstrom has criticized the notion that probable cause had been traditionally
considered a "flexible standard" or "fluid concept." See Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at
327, 337.
As a formal matter, the Gates Court discarded the "two-pronged" test for determining whether an affidavit alleged sufficient probable cause to justify a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant. Under the two-prong test, an affidavit first had to show the
"basis of knowledge" of the affiant's allegation that criminal activity was occurring. Second, it had to provide sufficient facts to indicate the "veracity" of the information contained in the affidavit, or alternatively, the "reliability" of an informant's allegations.
The two-prong test derived most of its substance from the Court's earlier holdings in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Gates decided that it was "wiser to abandon" the two-prong test. Gates, 462 U.S. at
238. Gates replaced it with a standard that asked whether on a "common sense" basis,
the "totality-of-the-drcumstances" established probable cause to believe criminality had
occurred. Id.
341
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"probability or substantial chance" of criminality;m5 it is sufficient if
circumstances "'warrant suspicion'" of criminal behavior.3 4 6 No
prima facie indication of criminality is needed.3 47 In fact, scholars of
diverse viewpoints agree that the probable cause test is now the
functional equivalent of a reason to suspect, or substantial possibil3 48
ity standard.
This raises a fundamental question. If evidence sufficient to
warrant a suspicion of criminal behavior satisfies the probable cause
standard, what, if anything, is left of the reasonable suspicion standard? If probable cause only means a "fair probability" or "substantial chance" of criminal behavior, is it possible to have a less
demanding standard without giving the police the right to search
3 49
and seize on a whim?

In an era of diluted probable cause, the Court should discard
462 U.S. at 244 n.13.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339,
348 (1813)). Professor Wasserstrom has properly criticized Gates's reliance on Locke to
clarify the meaning of probable cause because Locke:
had nothing to do with the fourth amendment requirements for a search
or a seizure. Indeed, in Nathanson v. United States, [290 U.S. 41 (1933)], a
case Justice Rehnquist cited approvingly in Gates, the Court dismissed
Locke as having no bearing on the question of probable cause to issue a
warrant. "[Locke] was a proceeding to forfeit a cargo of imported goods
seized for violation of the revenue laws. It presented no question concerning the validity of a warrant."
Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 336 (footnotes omitted).
347
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419). To drive home this
point, the Gates Court stated that "probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." 462 U.S. at 241
n.13.
348
See Grano, supra note 129, at 478; Daniel M. Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A
Response to "The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment", 22 AM. CIUM. L. REv. 25, 26
(1984); Kamisar, supra note 302, at 588; Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 336.
349
After Gates, articulating an intermediate standard between arbitrariness and
probable cause seems futile. Can a reasonable suspicion exist where there is a "lessthan-fair probability" or "insubstantial chance" of criminality? If probable cause is the
equivalent of a "substantial possibility standard," see Grano, supra note 129, at 478, or a
"reason to suspect" rule, see Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 338, then the police would
presumably have a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry seizure if there is a "less-thansubstantial possibility" or "less-than-reasonable-reason to suspect" criminal conduct.
Rather than eliminating the reasonable suspicion standard, Professor Sundby proposes that the analysis for a stop and frisk depend upon a "warrant clause-exigent circumstances analysis rather than a reasonableness clause-balancing test analysis."
Sundby, supra note 342, at 422. He contends that recasting Teny as an exigent circumstances case would limit the instances in which the reasonable suspicion standard would
supplant traditional probable cause: "Exigent circumstances would most likely exist
when the safety of the public or law enforcement agents is endangered. A Teny stop and
frisk [based upon reasonable suspicion], therefore would still pass constitutional muster.
Beyond police and public safety, however, the likelihood that valid exigent circumstances exist would correspondingly diminish." Id. at 423 (footnote omitted).
While I agree with Professor Sundby's conclusion that the reasonableness balancing
test of Camaraand Teny "closes in on traditional probable cause from all sides," Sundby,
345
346
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the reasonable suspicion test. First, after Gates there is no need for,
and no way to meaningfully articulate and apply, an intermediate
standard between probable cause and arbitrariness. Second, while
the reasonable suspicion rule is a powerful investigatory device, the
types of intrusions it permits have severe consequences for constitutional freedoms. Consider also that while the investigatory powers
of law enforcement officials have been expanding, society has nonetheless witnessed an increase in the use and availability of illegal
drugs. One has to wonder whether the alleged gain in law enforcement capabilities has been worth the price of the constitutional freedom lost.350
CONCLUSION

Stemming the flow of illegal narcotics is the driving force behind many cases involving police-citizen encounters, and behind
supra note 342, at 403, I disagree that the reasonable suspicion standard should be retained, even for stop and frisk cases.
Under Professor Sundby's modification, fourth amendment intrusions would be
permitted on reasonable suspicion when the safety of the police or public is endangered.
Apart from the problems of defining a third level of suspicion between probable cause
and police whim after Gates, see notes 341-48 and accompanying text, I wonder whether
Professor Sundby's reasonable suspicion-exigent circumstances exception would preclude the current Court from finding exigency in circumstances that present no immediate danger to the public. Cf United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985)
(rejecting rule that precludes police from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal
conduct). The Hens/ey Court noted:
[RIestraining police action until after probable cause is obtained would
not only hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect to
flee in the interim and to remain at large. Particularly in the context of
felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public
interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as
possible.
IL
Is there any doubt that the Court would find a sufficient threat to the public safety in
the aftermath of a tragic and highly publicized shooting? If one needs a recent example
of how the combination of homicide, racism, and public hysteria can work together-at
the expense of fourth amendment freedoms-the shooting of Charles and Carol Stuart
in Boston provides an excellent illustration. See Racial Manipulation in Boston, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1990, at A24, col. 1. For a discussion of the fourth amendment questions
raised by the Stuart shooting, see Maclin, supra note 10.
350 See Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible
Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and BalancingAskew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1223-24 (1983). Indeed, a special committee chaired by Professor Dash has found "evidence that certain disregard for the Fourth Amendment, specifically in drug cases, may
be an unavoidable by-product of a drug problem so pervasive that the police feel they
sometimes must violate constitutional restraints in order to regain control of the
streets." Professor Dash's committee emphasized that "the problem is drug use[,] and
not the constitutional restrictions on the police. The legal and illegal searches and arrests for drugs have generally proven ineffective in controlling or reducing the drug
problem."
CAN

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY OF THE AMERI-

BAR AssOCIATION

CRIMINALJusTICE SECTION, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CrusIs 46

(1988).
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much of the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence in general.3 5 1
However, the Terry doctrine has not been a panacea for law enforcement officials. Despite two decades of rulings enlarging the
government's investigatory powers, there has been no reduction in
the use of illegal narcotics. Of course, law enforcement officials cannot be blamed for society's increasing drug habit. This criticism is
not meant to approve the use of illegal drugs, nor is it intended to
discourage police efforts in the fight against drug trafficking. Police
officials, however, are being asked to resolve a social problem that is
beyond their resources and expertise to address alone.3 5 2 Neverthe-

less, the Court remains fixated on expanding the government's investigatory powers to help control the drug crisis3 5 3 despite growing
evidence that traditional law enforcement efforts are futile. There is
no current evidence to support the proposition that a further expansion of police power will deter future drug use.3 54
351
Professor LaFave has made the point more bluntly: "[I]t is almost as if a majority
of the Court was hell-bent to seize any available opportunity to define more expansively
the constitutional authority of law enforcement officials." LaFave, supra note 350, at
1222. Cf. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The FourthAmendment (As
Illustratedby the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 3 (1986) ("It is understandable
that the judicial branch of government would want to join with the other two in fighting
against the use of illegal drugs.").
352
See, e.g., Mathea Falco, The Bush Drug Plan: Nothing New, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1989, at A19 (criticizing the Bush Administration's new drug plan because the "new
strategy would continue to concentrate primarily on law enforcement, despite overwhelming evidence accumulated during the past eight years of the minimal impact of law
enforcement on drug abuse and drug trafficking.").
The social decay associated with narcotics is too well-known and pervasive to categorize here. Suffice it to say that all segments of society have a substantial interest in
stemming the flow of narcotics into the country and our neighborhoods. But when law
enforcement officials concede that conventional police methods will not deter drug
abuse, society is naive to believe that greater investigatory powers for the police will
solve the drug crisis. See Robert Reinhold, Police, HardPressed in Drug War, Are Turning to
Preventive Efforts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1989, at Al.
353 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied,
109 S. Ct. 1659 (1989). Justice Brennan stated:
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the plurality has allowed its analysis of Riley's expectation of privacy to be colored by its distaste for the
activity in which he was engaged. It is indeed easy to forget, especially in
view of current concern over drug trafficking, that the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's protection does not turn on whether the activities disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous.
Id. at 703.
354 See President's "Victory Over Drugs" Is Decades Away, Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Sept.
24, 1989, § 1, at 1; After Studyingfor War on Drugs, Bennett Wants More Troops, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1989, § 4, at 5. This article noted that:
[S]ome law-enforcement professionals grouse that [Director of National
Drug Control Policy] Bennett is too reliant on law-and-order prescriptions for a problem with deep social and economic roots. "I know it
would be heresy for a cop to say this, but we need to quadruple our effort
on the demand side," said Sheriff Clarence W. Dupnik of Pima County,
Ariz ...
But such programs will get short shrift, he added, because
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While the Court has continued to expand police authority, our
right of locomotion has been sharply curtailed. Law-abiding persons can be accosted and questioned by police officers at any time.
An individual, in effect, can be required to "show his papers" to a
curious officer, even though the officer has no reason to suspect the
person of wrongdoing. Citizens may be chased down the streets at
the whim of patrolling police officers.
Government agents may conduct surprise raids without constitutional restraint. If such raids may occur at a factory where agents
stop and question all of those present, what is to prevent similar
raids from occurring in a public park or on a downtown boulevard?
If the police may chase a person down a Detroit alley without any
objective reason to believe the person has committed a crime, what
prevents a judge from allowing the police to chase a minority youth
walking in a white upper-class suburb, or to shine their search lights
55
into a parked car?3
A right of locomotion-the right to be left alone in public-is
meaningless if police officials are free to board buses or trains and
ask to see the identification of, or search the luggage of, every passenger. Is not such a state of affairs "repugnant to American institutions and ideals"? 5 6 Is the war on drugs worth such a high cost in
constitutional freedom? Rather than sacrificing constitutional liberties, our resources would be more efficiently spent on educating,
rehabilitating, and creating economic opportunities for those currently engaged in narcotics use and trafficking.
Moreover, society should be equally concerned when law enforcement agents use untested and unreliable drug courier profiles
to forcibly seize persons whose dress, appearance, or mode of travel
differ from the norm. We often forget that "[plower is a heady
thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot
57

3
be trusted."
Concern over crime and drugs generate little sympathy for the
unsavory characters who are accosted and chased by the police in
public places.3 5 8 But we should recall Justice Douglas's warning at

"people are in a 'lock 'er up and throw the key away' mood, and it is that
emotion that is fueling our national policy."
Id.
See People v. Perez, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1492, 260 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1989).
State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983)
(Feldman, J., concurring).
357 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
358
Police conduct that violates the rights of the Chesternuts and Sokolows of society
should concern everyone because "[lt is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
355
356
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the time Teny was decided: If the Constitution allows the police to
accost citizens on a whim, then the "sleepless professor who walks
in the night to find the relaxation for sleep is easy prey to the police,
as are thousands of other innocent Americans raised in the sturdy
environment where no policeman can lay a hand on the citizen without 'probable cause.' -159 When the police are permitted to detain
and search citizens because their actions appear to be "out of the
ordinary," or because an officer's common sense suggests further
investigation is necessary, then the list of casualties will be a lot
longer than Chesternut and Sokolow. Everyone is a potential
60
target.3
Alexander Bickel once wrote "that many actions of government
have two aspects: their immediate, necessarily intended, practical
effects, and their perhaps unintended or unappreciated bearing on
'3 6 1
values we hold to have more general and permanent interest.
This statement, written over twenty-five years ago, aptly describes
the dilemma that faces society in our latest crisis concerning illegal
narcotics. Government officials advocate strong measures for getting "tough" on drug users and traffickers, and sacrifices are urged
to accomplish the task, including compromising the rights protected
3 62
by the fourth amendment.
359 Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 614 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For a telling illustration of what could occur to a professor who walks the streets at
night, see Professor Reich's descriptions of his encounters with the police. Reich, supra
note 161.
360
"So a search against Brinegar's car must be regarded as a search of the car of
Everyman." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1189-90
(1988) ("The scrupulous protection of fourth amendment liberties in any case redounds
to the benefit not only of the individual who is directly involved, but also of everyone
else, since we are all subject to the standards for police conduct which emerge from
individual cases.") (footnote omitted); Saltzburg, supra note 351, at 25. Professor
Saltzburg argued:
Before our courts decide to abandon the fourth amendment law that has
protected the right of people to find private places and to be left alone,
the need for these new law enforcement measures ought to be more
clearly demonstrated. Otherwise, the most important victim of illegal
drugs may be the liberty of a nation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
361
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962).
362
See, e.g., Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1159 (Fla. 1989) (McDonald, J.,
dissenting) ("The entire war on drugs is distasteful, and society should accept some
minimal inconvenience and minimal incursion on their rights of privacy in that fight.")
cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1990) (No. 89-1717); R. Morin, Many in Poll
Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough; Mandatory Drug Tests, Searches Backed, Washington
Post, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al (poll showed following attitudes among public: "62 percent of
those questioned said they would be willing to give up 'a few of the freedoms we have in
this country' to significantly reduce illegal drug use"; "52 percent said they would agree
to let police search homes of suspected drug dealers without a court order, even if the
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The desire to conduct a "war on drugs" reflects the first aspect
of government conduct to which Professor Bickel spoke: the ability
to serve our "immediate material needs. 8' 63 But there is another
side to this "war": its unappreciated impact on fourth amendment
values. The Court's current methodology and crabbed view of the
fourth amendment's protection for those on the street is the inevitable result of replacing traditional fourth amendment principles without ad hoc balancing. The unstructured balancing formula wrung
from Terry should be discarded so the fourth amendment can return
3 64
to its rightful place "in the catalog of indispensable freedoms"
65
that sets our nation apart from much of the world.

houses 'of people like you were sometimes searched by mistake' "; "67 percent favored
allowing the police to stop cars at random to search for drugs, 'even if it means that the
cars of people like you are sometimes stopped and searched' ").
363 A. BICKEL, supra note 361, at 24.
364 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
365 One cannot... imagine a free society without some protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. By definition, a society that permits
its police to search or arrest whenever or whomever they please is not a
free society .... The fourth amendment, therefore, should be viewed
along with a few other safeguards, such as the first amendment's protection of political speech, as a bulwark of civil liberty and of freedom itself.
Grano, supra note 129, at 519-20 (footnote omitted).

